

McGILLAN, GEORGE

DRAWER 9A GENERALS (UNION)

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Civil War Officers Union

George McClellan

Excerpts from newspapers and other sources

From the files of the
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General McClellan to Secretary Stanton
June 28, 1862—12:20 A. M.

The following letter, from the correspondence of General McClellan with the War Department, lately published:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
SAVAGE'S STATION,
June 28, 1862—12:20 A. M.

I now know the full history of the day. On this side of the river, the right bank, we repulsed several strong attacks. On the left bank our men did all that men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish, but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most desperate battle of the war. The sad remnants of my men behave as men; those battalions who fought most bravely, and suffered most, are still in the best order.

The regulars were superb, and I count upon what are left to turn another battle in company with their gallant comrades of the volunteers. Had I twenty thousand (20,000) or even ten thousand (10,000) fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could take Richmond; but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and *personnel* of the army. If we have lost the day, we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need blush for the Army of the Potomac. I have lost this battle because my force was too small.

I again repeat that I am not responsible for this, and I say it with the earnestness of a General who feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to retrieve our fortunes; but to do this the Government must view the matter in the same earnest light that I do. You must send me very large re-enforcements, and send them at once.

I shall draw back to this side of the Chickahominy and think I can withdraw all our material. Please understand that in this battle we have lost nothing but men, and those the best we have.

In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the President that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my force was too weak—I merely intimated a truth which to-day has been too plainly proven. If, at this instant, I could dispose of (10,000) ten thousand fresh men I could gain the victory to-morrow.

I know that a few thousand more men would have changed the battle from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the government must not and cannot hold me responsible for the result.

I feel too earnestly to-night—I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the government has not sustained the army. If you do not do so now, the game is lost.

If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you, or to any other person in Washington.

You have done your best to sacrifice this army.

G. B. McClellan
To Hon. E. M. Stanton.

Book: Transcript

July 9/86

GENERAL MCCLELLAN AND THE PRESIDENT.
The New York Evening Post of yesterday, in an editorial article, makes this positive statement: "Everybody that knows anything of the matter knows that Stanton has withheld no reinforcements from McClellan, except as directed by the President; and we may add to that information that the President has McClellan's own letters thanking him for reinforcements, and declaring, after McClellan's division arrived on the Peninsula, that he 'had more than enough troops to enter Richmond.'"

THE PRESIDENCY.

New Jersey's Tribute to Gen. Geo. B. McClellan.

Serenade at Orange.

Delegations Present from the Adjacent Cities and Towns.

Ten Thousand People Present.

Orange Filled with Patriots and Illuminated with Lanterns.

SPEECH OF GEN. McCLELLAN.

Unbounded Enthusiasm for "Little Mac."

LINCOLN MEETING IN THIS CITY

Dusk Display in Bright Array of Office-Holders, Contractors, Shoddyites and Miscegenators.

&c., &c., &c.

The citizens of Orange, with no very marked distinction of party, united last night in a grand popular demonstration to their neighbor and fellow-townsmen, General George B. McClellan, who is now staying at his residence in that place. It was, without exception, the largest gathering of people that ever occurred at that place, and was marked by unexampled unanimity and enthusiasm. Large delegations were present from all the towns and villages round about, and a special train on the Morris and Essex Railroad to New-York after the serenade, showed that a very large delegation had attended from New-York. There were two stands erected for speakers, but before 9 o'clock these were insufficient to satisfy the crowd, and speeches were at one time being made from three extemporized platforms besides. The display of illuminations and transparencies, mottoes, lanterns, and banners was very fine. It was estimated that the number of people present during the evening could not be less than ten thousand. Among the delegations from New-York were one from Crystal House Company No. 35, and one from the Young Men's Democratic Club.

The meeting, which was in some degree distinct from the serenade, was under the auspices of the Orange McClellan Club. The first stand was presided over by Philip Kissam, Esq., its president, and the second by ex-mayor Ticheator. Among the officers of the meeting were the following gentlemen:

James W. Field, Secretary; George W. Campbell, George Ward, Owen Murphy, Theodorius A. Fowler, Andrew Button, John W. Whiting, J. H. Abbott, A. P. Pillott, Douglas Robinson,

Simeon Harrison, Wheeler Lindsley, Napoleon Stetson, J. H. Mathews, George Merrill, John Merrill, Thomas O. Woodruff, George W. Campbell, George Ward, Owen Murphy, Thomas A. Fowler, Andrew Button.

Among the other speakers at the various stands, were Governor Parker, of New Jersey Hon. A. J. Rogers, Hon. James Brooks, Hon. John Daggett Hunt, Theodore E. Tomlinson, Spencer W. Cone, W. J. A. Fuller, Leon Abbott, Hiram Ketchum, Jr., J. Curtis Ackerman, Charles Waters, Dr. F. Larsenor, and others.

The first speech at the main stand was made by Hon. A. J. Rogers (member of Congress), and was received with the greatest enthusiasm. We regret that the lateness of the hour prevents us from giving even an abstract of his remarks.

SPEECH OF GOVERNOR PARKER.

Governor Parker was the next speaker. He said it did his heart good to see so grand a demonstration at the very home of our gallant standard-bearer. It shows that he is beloved among his neighbors, and that the villifications to which he is subject from his enemies are not sufficient to destroy confidence in him by those who know him. As for the villifications concerning his action in the field we have the evidence of his adversaries that they are false. President Lincoln wrote to him after his greatest battle, saying that he had fought it nobly, and that his heroism should always be remembered. Ah, they don't remember it now! (Laughter.) [The procession from the Seventh ward here passed, and were received with cheers.] General Halleck, in the hour of need, sent to McClellan, saying to him, "Come assist me with your talents and ability." But for the ability of George B. McClellan, Mr. Lincoln and his cabinet would be fugitives from Washington, or perhaps be cracking their jokes in Libby prison. Congress on two several occasions have passed resolutions in which they eulogized his victories as among the best in the war. Those who speak disparagingly of the courage of McClellan should look to their own candidate. It is stated that he still has an old Scotch clock hanging by the head of his bed, for which he reaches when Stuart's cavalry are about. What is our condition to-day? We have a war upon our hands such as no nation ever had. We have had two millions of men in the field, half of whom are dead or disabled. We are in debt to-day four thousand millions of dollars. We have our state, town, county, township debt, besides that of the nation. That is a mortgage on the land, personal property, and industry of the land. We are in debt to the amount of one quarter of the property of the country. Our money has been recklessly thrown away; and to-day the money of the people is being used profusely to re-elect the President of the United States. At the reckless way in which they are spending money it would seem as though they intended to repudiate the debt. The only way to save your government securities is to elect McClellan. The present administration has violated its financial pledges many times. Let us inquire next

who are responsible for the war. In the first place, the secessionists of the South are responsible for it. Nothing can justify their action. We are asked sometimes why we don't abuse the rebels. We would do it all night if it would do any good. But they don't hear us. But there is some blame for the war on this side. Gov. Parker then referred to the acts and speeches of the abolitionists, which were done to exasperate the South. If slavery existed in this state, and I was to vote on the question of its abolition, I should vote in favor of its abolition. But I say, that every state has the right to decide as to what their own institutions shall be, and they are only responsible to themselves. There were many honest men, not abolitionists, who voted for Lincoln; but after the "To whom it may concern" letter, in which Lincoln announced that the Union could not be restored without the abolition of slavery, these men will leave that party and join the only Union party of the country. Mr. Lincoln has violated his sacred promises made at the beginning of his administration, and has carried on the war for a partisan purpose, and in a partisan manner. Messrs. Wade and Davis said worse things against Lincoln than Vallandigham did. They called him a usurper, and said he intended to get his re-election by fraud; and yet it is said they will vote for him. Freedom, too, it is said, goes for him, who says that he is unfit for the office. Pomery, who in his letter called Lincoln "a

imbecile" also, it is said, goes for him. This is a curious state of affairs. Can such men be enthusiastic in the support of Lincoln? Governor Parker concluded with an eloquent peroration.

The president then announced that Grafula's band from New-York would serenade General McClellan at the Park Hotel across the way, and that the people would probably have an opportunity to see and hear the standard-bearer at the close of the serenade. At this a shout went up, and the crowd swayed and closed toward the hotel. The mass at this time was dense and broad, the transparencies lighting up the whole street for a long distance between the hotel and the Park.

Several airs in the best style, of the Seventh regiment, were then played. General McClellan in the mean time occupying a parlor in the hotel where he had been presented to a large number of ladies, who had assembled to pay the compliment of their beauty and enthusiasm to the occasion.

At the close of the music, the committee and invited guests took their station upon the balcony. Several lamps held by firemen in red shirts from the procession lit up one portion of it, and General McClellan accompanied by Governor Parker appeared. He was immediately recognized and received with the most tumultuous cheering, which was unceasing for several minutes and concluded and concluded finally by three regular and tremendous cheers for "the next president of the United States."

Mr. Kissam then introduced Governor Parker, and again cheering for McClellan was continued, the boom of a cannon was heard, and rockets shot with a whiz into the air, lightening up the whole space around.

ADDRESS OF GOVERNOR PARKER

Governor Parker then addressed the general as follows:

DEAR VICTORY: We have met to-night to offer you their congratulations and to respond to the choice of the convention that nominated you for the highest office in the gift of the American people. I have been requested by the people of this vicinity to address you a few words expressive of their appreciation of your high character and public services. They recognize in you a man of strict integrity and blameless private life, a man without guile or selfishness, a man of noble impulses, whose only desire is to serve faithfully your country in whatever situation you may occupy. They also recognize in your eminent military ability, developed in early life, and which in maturer years saved the capital of your country when all seemed hopeless, and drove back a powerful and victorious rebel army. They recognize in you a high-toned patriotism, that in this rebellion caused you among the first to draw your sword and resent the insult to your country's flag, and which for that country's sake enables you to bear neglect and bitter persecution without complaint, confident that the rules above will at last make all things even, and that justice will vindicate your motives and your character. They also recognize in you a man of eminent ability, who, in the conduct of the war, developed the only safe policy by which we can hope to achieve an honorable and lasting peace; a policy which directs our forces only against armed bodies of men and treats the unarmed inhabitants in such a manner as to win them back to the Union, believing that military success will be fruitless unless it brings with it a Union not merely of lands, but of hearts as well. You, s.r., will never consent to a dishonorable peace. You will not consent to peace without Union. You have declared that the Union must be maintained at all hazards. (Tremendous cheers.) You do not favor a continuance of this sanguinary strife one moment longer than is necessary to restore the Union under the Constitution of our fathers. You will not continue the war for the purpose of inflicting by force on the people of any State who may desire to return to their allegiance a conditional loyalty. You will not ask that more treasure shall be spent or more blood spilt merely for the purpose of overthrowing their domestic institutions. The Union is the one con-

union of peace. You ask no more. General, I cannot refrain from congratulating you and the people here assembled, on the victories which have recently been achieved by our brave army and navy. We will not prostitute these victories by using them for particular purposes. Should we do so the blood of the heroes slain would cry out in indignation. We rejoice, because we see signs of hope for the country. Governor Parker closed as follows: I hope and pray that our recent victories in the field will not be in vain, but that they may be followed by the crowning civil victory at the polls, and that the man may be elevated to the Presidency who will so improve those victories that peace and union may soon smile upon our bleeding and distracted country.

GENERAL McCLELLAN'S REMARKS.

General McClellan was again greeted with enthusiastic cheers. He stepped to the front of the platform and spoke as follows:

MY FRIENDS AND NEIGHBORS AND YOUR EXCELLENCE: I am not here tonight to make a speech, but merely to accept and acknowledge this most pleasant compliment. I trust that I may regard it as the sure presage of that political victory in favor of the Constitution and the laws which should follow and render complete those recent victories which still stir our blood, won by our heroic navy and army. (Great cheering,) those victories won by the grand old Admiral Farragut, the brilliant and accomplished Sherman, the intrepid and energetic Sheridan. I thank you, my friends, for this most brilliant demonstration far exceeding all that I had anticipated.

I thank your excellency for your too flattering sentiments, and I trust you will now permit me to say good-night.

General McClellan was cheered again and again in the most enthusiastic manner by the great assembly, that seemed unwilling to let him go.

New York World
Sept 28, 1864

McCLELLAN IN THE LINCOLN HISTORY.

Written expressly for THE LEADER by Samuel E. Carrell, editor Dallas County Democrat.

The life of Abraham Lincoln by Hay and Nicolay, which has been running in the Century Magazine for the past two years, has from the start given palpable proof of the partisan spirit animating the writers. They seem incapable of rising above their prejudices, and giving history instead of opinionated vituperation and abuse. The last two or three installments of this so-called "history" have largely been devoted to defaming the memory of Gen. George B. McClellan. The authors appear to be particularly bitter in their enmity against him, and lose no occasion to vent their spleen in sneering allusions and violent abuse.

In the current (January) number, the events treated of are Pope's Virginia campaign, with its disastrous ending in the second battle of Bull Run, and succeeding events up to and including the battle of Antietam. The responsibility for Pope's humiliating defeat is placed on McClellan's shoulders on the ground that he did not send his army to reinforce Pope as rapidly as he might have done, though it is casually admitted that Pope could have saved his credit and his army as well by withdrawing after the first day's fighting. It is also reluctantly confessed that he made a serious error in failing to properly locate the confederate position, and so placed his men where they were subject to a terrible cross-fire from the enemy's artillery.

Without stopping to discuss at length McClellan's relation to Pope's defeat, it is sufficient to say that there is no evidence adduced by Messrs. Hay and Nicolay which disproves McClellan's statement in his autobiography that he rendered Pope all the aid he was able to, in view of all the circumstances.

Passing on, these writers sneer at McClellan's statement in his "Own Story" that Lincoln, in asking him to take charge of the shattered and dispirited army, had expressed the opinion that it would be impossible to save Washington. The method they take to prove that McClellan's statement was not true is of a piece with most of the other evidence produced by these extraordinary historians. They say:

The truth is, McClellan himself has left evidence of the fact that he thought Washington in danger. He wrote to his wife: "I do not regard Washington as safe against the rebels. If I can quietly slip over there, I will send your silver off."

This letter does seem to be quite conclusive and might settle the matter, but for the fact shown by the letter itself, that it was written while McClellan was still in Alexandria, the day after Pope's defeat, but before it was known how disastrous that defeat was, and while Pope was still in command. To quote this letter as evidence that McClellan expected Washington to be taken after he was given command of the city and its defenses, is a piece of pettifoggery which ostensible writers of history ought to be above indulging in. (The letter from which the extract is taken, appears on page 532, McClellan's "Own Story.")

Similarly unfair is the account of McClellan's pursuit of Lee into Maryland and the events preceding the battle of Antietam.

Speaking of McClellan's march in the track of Lee's invading army, they say:

He (McClellan) was in no haste; he ordered his officers beforehand to avoid collisions. He attempts in his reports to account for his tardy marching on the ground that the authorities at Washington wished him not to go too far from the capital.

Then they quote General Halleck, then commander in chief, who in his testimony before the committee on the conduct of the war, denied that any order bearing that construction had been given. He says he telegraphed McClellan "that he was going too far not from Washington but from the Potomac." If the Century writers had been writing to vindicate the truth of history instead of to defame McClellan, they would have stated that the latter in his "Own Story" disproves Halleck's statement, by quoting from the original orders. McClellan set out from Washington in pursuit of Lee on September 7, 1862. On the 13th Halleck telegraphed him from Washington:

Until you know more certainly the enemy's force south of the Potomac, you are wrong in this uncovering the capital. I am of the opinion that the enemy will send a small column toward Pennsylvania to draw your forces in that direction, and then move suddenly on Washington with the forces south of the Potomac.

Again on the 14th Halleck telegraphed:

Scouts report a large force still on the Virginia side of the Potomac. If so, I fear you are exposing your left and rear.

Still again, on the 16th, only the day before the battle of Antietam was fought, Halleck was still afraid McClellan was getting too far away to protect Washington. He says:

I think, however, you will find that the whole force of your enemy in your front has crossed the river. I fear uhw more than ever that they will recross at Harper's Ferry or below, and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington. This has appeared to me to be a part of their plan, and hence my anxiety on the subject.

In view of these daily warnings from his superior officer not to uncover the capital, and the reiterated prediction that Lee was only drawing him on a wild goose chase in order to slip his army between him and Washington, is it any

great wonder that, McClellan "was in no haste," made "only one move a day," and "ordered his officers beforehand to avoid collisions?" And was he not justified in defending his cautious advance "on the ground that the authorities at Washington wished him not to go too far from the capital?" It is easy enough now to see that McClellan might have safely made all possible speed in pursuing Lee. But in view of his situation then—the uncertainty as to Lee's position or intentions, and with the constant warnings of Halleck in his ears, it is only strange that McClellan made sufficient haste to overtake Lee at all.

The truth of the matter is, and their entire "history" plainly shows it; Messrs. Hay and Nicolay are too bitterly prejudiced against McClellan, and too narrow minded to treat him with anything approaching common fairness. It is gratifying to know however, that "Little Mac's" reputation for ability and patriotism is now too firmly established to be disturbed by the misrepresentations of these two partisan historians.

LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN.

The Successful President and the Unsuccessful General.

Lincoln Was McClellan's Friend—McClellan the Great Organizer and Defensive General of the War—His Loyalty and Patriotism.

1892

Special Correspondence of the Globe-Democrat.

PHILADELPHIA, Pa., January 21.—Not until all the lingering personal, political and military passions of the war shall have perished can the impartial historian tell the true story of Abraham Lincoln's relations to George B. McClellan, nor will the just estimate of McClellan as a military chieftain be recorded until the future historian comes to his task entirely free from the prejudices of the present. Although more than a quarter of a century has elapsed since the close of the war, and countless contributions have been given to the history of that conflict from every shade of conviction that survived it, McClellan's ability as a military commander, and the correctness of Lincoln's action in calling him to command and in dismissing him from command, are as earnestly disputed to-day as they were in the white heat of the personal and political conflicts of the time. Notwithstanding the bitter partisan assaults which have been made upon McClellan in the violence of party struggles, at times imputing his skill, his courage and his patriotism, it is safe to say that fair-minded men of every political faith now testify to the absolute purity of his patriotism, to his exceptional skill as a military organizer and to his courage as a commander. I knew McClellan well, and I believe that no reasonably just man could have known him without yielding to him the



ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

highest measure of personal respect. He was one of the most excellent and lovable characters I have ever met, and that he was patriotic in everything that he did, however he may have erred, and that he would have given his life as a sacrifice to his army or his country had duty required it, will not be doubted within the circle of his personal associations. I saw him frequently after he came to Washington heralded as the "Young Napoleon" to perform the herculean task of organizing the best army that ever was organized in any country within the same period of time. I saw him when he started upon his Peninsula campaign with the hope of victory beaming from his bright young face, and I stood close by his side most of the day when he fought his last battle at Antietam. Only a few months thereafter he was finally relieved from his command, and his military career ended on November 5, 1862, when, by order of the President, he transferred his army to Gen. Burnside and went to Trenton, N. J., "for further orders." The "further orders" never came until presidential election day, 1864, when McClellan resigned his commission as Major General in the army, and Sheridan was appointed to his place.

Both Lincoln and McClellan now live only in history, and history will judge them by their achievements, as it has judged all mankind. Lincoln was a successful President, and, like the noted Roman Germanicus, "fortunate in the opportunity of his death." McClellan was an unsuccessful General and a defeated politician. Such will be the imperishable records of history as to these two men, but even the next generation will see continued disparagement as to McClellan's capabilities as a commander, and Lincoln will be censured alike for having maintained and supported McClellan as a military leader, and for having failed to appreciate and support him after having called him to responsible command. None the less, however, will be the irrevocable judgment of history that Lincoln succeeded and that McClellan failed. But why did McClellan fail as a military commander? The answer of his devoted partisans is that he was deliberately hindered and embarrassed in every military movement, and that he would have achieved great success had he been supported as the more successful Generals later in the war were supported by the Government. To this comes the response from the friends of Lincoln that he earnestly and heartily seconded McClellan to the utmost of his resources; that he long confided in him when the confidence of his friends had been greatly shattered; that he reappointed him to command against his Cabinet and against the general sentiment of his party leaders, and that whatever failures were suffered by McClellan were the result of his own incompetency or of the inability of the Government to meet his wants.

It is unjust to McClellan to judge him by the same standard that is applied to the successful Generals who succeeded him. I believe that it was McClellan's greatest misfortune that he was suddenly called to the dazzling position of Commander-in-chief when he was a comparative novice in great war operations, and without the experience necessary to make a great commander. I believe that the 23d of April, 1861, was the fateful day that dated the beginning of McClellan's misfortunes. He was then in Cincinnati in charge of one of the railroads connected with that city. The Pennsylvania Reserves had just been organized by Gov. Curtin, and he was in search of a Pennsylvanian of educated military attainments to place him in command. He first offered the position to McClellan, who promptly arranged his business to go to Harrisburg in person with the view of accepting it. By special request he stopped at Columbus on his way to Harrisburg, to confer with Gov. Dennison on some military problems which were vexing the Governor of Ohio. He expected to remain at Columbus only a few hours and then proceeded to Pennsylvania. While in conference with Gov. Dennison he was tendered the commission of Major General commanding the volunteers of Ohio, although ineligible because of his want of residence in that State. The difficulty was obviated by both branches of the Legislature passing, in a few hours, a bill making him eligible, and on the same 23d of April, 1861, he was commissioned as Major General and assigned to the command of the Ohio State troops. This led to his skirmishes in West Virginia, which in that day were magnified into great battles and great victories, and, when it became necessary to select a successor to Scott as Commander-in-chief, McClellan was the only General whose victories had attracted the attention of the nation. He was thus called to the responsible position of Commander-in-chief when a little over 30 years of age, with no experience in war beyond a brief campaign in Mexico, and without the training necessary to enable him to comprehend the most colossal war of modern times. Had he accepted the command of the Pennsylvania Reserves, he would, doubtless, have made them the best disciplined and most effective division of the Army of the Potomac; would have fought them wisely and gallantly in every conflict, and would have won distinction as a commander with the experience that would have led him to maintain it. Instead of mounding along in untrodden paths and committing errors for others to profit by, he would have seen others charged with the gravest responsibility that could be assigned to any military man; would have seen them blunder and fail, and would have been ripened, by his own experience and by the misfortunes of his superiors, for the command that he won so suddenly and twice lost by order of a President who sincerely desired to be McClellan's friend and to give him success.

McClellan's fundamental error, and the one that I believe was the fountain of most, if not all, his misfortunes, was in his assumption that Lincoln and the Government generally were not only unfriendly to him when he started out on his spring campaign of 1862, but that they deliberately conspired to prevent him from achieving military success. This was a fatal error, and it was certainly most unjust to Lincoln. If McClellan really believed that the Government had pre-

determined his military failure, or if he seriously doubted his fidelity, it exhibited moral cowardice on his part to march an army into hopeless battle. He might have believed the President, the Secretary of War and the Administration generally, to have been unfriendly to him; and yet, relying upon his ability to win their confidence by winning victory, he could have retained his command with justice to himself and to the country; but his own statements show that he believed then that he would not be permitted to win a victory or to capture Richmond; and thus believing, he owed it to himself, to the great army he had organized as none other could have organized it, and to the country to whose cause he was undoubtedly loyal, to have resigned the command and put the responsibility upon those he believed to be conspirators for the destruction of himself and his army.

McClellan had not left this question open to dispute. In "McClellan's Own Story," written by himself, on page 150, he says: "They (the President and others) determined to ruin me in any event and by any means. First, by endeavoring to force me into premature movements, knowing that a failure would end my military career; afterward by withholding the means necessary to achieve success." On the same page he says: "They determined that I should not succeed, and carried out their determinations only too well, at a fearful sacrifice of blood, time and treasure." On page 151, in the same book, McClellan says: "From the light that has since been thrown on Stanton's character I am satisfied that from an early day he was in this treasonable conspiracy." It will thus be seen that McClellan started on his Peninsula campaign not merely believing that the President and the Administration generally were unfriendly to him, but really believing that they had formed a treasonable conspiracy by which his military movements should be made disastrous and the blood of thousands of brave soldiers sacrificed to accomplish McClellan's overthrow. This is a monstrous accusation against Lincoln, and but for the fact that McClellan presents it so clearly in language from his own pen that none can mistake, it would seem incredible that he could have believed such a conspiracy to exist, and yet led a great army to inevitable defeat because of treachery on the part of the Government. In this I am sure that McClellan does both himself and Lincoln the gravest injustice. Lincoln was the one man of all who was utterly incapable of deliberately hindering military success under any circumstances. There were those who believed it best to protract the war in order to accomplish the overthrow of slavery, but Lincoln was not of that number. On the contrary, he offended many when he distinctly declared in his letter to Greeley, August 22, 1862: "If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and it is not either to save it or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that." What Lincoln wanted was the speediest overthrow of the rebellion and the restoration of the Union, with or without the destruction of slavery; and the assumption that he could have been capable of such a treasonable conspiracy as to deliberately send a General to the field with a great army solely to have that army sacrificed and its commander dishonored, is at war with every attribute of Lincoln's character. There never was the blood of a soldier shed in battle that did not bring grief to the heart of Abraham Lincoln, and there never was a disaster of the Union that did not shadow his face with sorrow, no matter whether he loved or distrusted the commander. I am quite sure that the two men of all the men of the nation who most desired McClellan's success in the field were Lincoln and McClellan themselves.

I have said that it is unjust to McClellan to compare his achievements in the first great campaign of the war with the achievements of Grant and Sherman in the later campaigns which culminated in the overthrow of the rebellion. All the Generals of the early part of the war were making object lessons to guide themselves and those who succeeded them in later conflicts. In this work the many failed, and many of the most promising among them. The few succeeded and made their names immortal. One of the greatest wars of history produced but one Grant and one Lee; but one Joe Johnston and one Tecumseh Sherman; but one Phil Sheridan and one Stonewall Jackson. Scores of Generals on both sides had opportunities of winning the laurels of these great chieftains, but none were equal to the task. It is no reproach to McClellan to say that Grant fought few battles which McClellan would have fought under precisely similar circumstances. McClellan was an organizer, a disciplinarian and the best defensive General in all the armies of the late war. He would have made a greater Confederate leader than Lee himself. He would never have made the exhaust-

ive and fruitless campaigns of the second Bull Run and Antietam, which cost Lee one-fourth of his army, when he had feeble means to replace his losses. He never would have made an aggressive campaign to Gettysburg when the resources of the Confederacy were so nearly exhausted, and Pickett's charge would never have been dreamed of by McClellan. He was the greatest organizer and defensive officer of the age, but the Union cause demanded swift and terrible blows and countless sacrifices. It had to fight on fields chosen by the enemy. It had often to give two men for one in the death lists of the struggles, but it had boundless resources to fill the shattered ranks. The most aggressive warfare was certain to bring the speediest victory and with the least sacrifice of life and treasure in the end. Grant met this want. He was the great aggressive General of the war. He always fought when he should have fought, and sometimes fought when it would have been wiser to have refrained. Had he been a Southern General he would have been an utter failure, for the Southern General had to



GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

study how to husband resources; how to protect the life of every soldier; how to fight only when 1000 men could withstand 2000, and with that system of warfare Grant was an entire stranger. He was the embodiment of aggressive warfare; McClellan was the embodiment of defensive warfare, and McClellan was as great as Grant in his line, and with no greater limitations upon his military genius.

Grant fought one defensive battle at Shiloh and lost it and lost his command. McClellan fought only one pitched battle as the aggressor at Antietam, and then he was strategically defensive, while tactically aggressive, but his military genius shone resplendent in his defensive battles when retreating to the James River. Thus a condition confronted McClellan to which his great military genius and attainments were not best adapted, and Grant's star rose and brightened as McClellan's faded, because Grant possessed, in the fullest measure, the qualities needed to win peace and restore the republic.

No man ever commanded the Army of the Potomac for whom the soldiers had so much affection as they had for McClellan. They knew that he was a soldier and a great soldier. They knew that he would never put them into action unless good generalship dictated it. They knew they were safe from wanton sacrifice while under his command. They knew that he valued the life of every man with the tenderness of a parent, and they loved him because they revered and trusted him. Lincoln fully appreciated and greatly valued the devotion of the army to McClellan. He believed that no other General could have so quickly organized and disciplined a great army out of entirely raw materials as McClellan had done, and he never gave up faith in McClellan until he felt that he could no longer trust the destiny of the war to McClellan's direction. He was many times justly fretted at McClellan's complaints about military matters, at his obtrusive criticism about political matters, and especially at his insulting declaration to the Secretary of War, in a letter dated at army headquarters on the Peninsula, June 28, 1862, just after his retreat to the James River, in which he said: "If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other person in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army." This letter, although addressed to the Secretary of War, distinctly embraced the President in the grave charge of conspiracy to defeat McClellan's army and sacrifice thousands of the lives of his soldiers. None but a man of Lincoln's exceptional forbearance and patience would have tolerated McClellan in command for a day after such a declaration, written from the headquarters

of a defeated army, but Lincoln neither disapproved nor reproached him, nor did he ever allude to it as far as I can learn.

Ten days after the offensive and insubordinate letter was written Lincoln visited McClellan at his headquarters on the James River. While Lincoln was there McClellan personally handed him a letter dated July 7, 1862, that was a caustic criticism of the political and military policy of the Administration, and assumed to define not only the military action of the Government, but the civil and political policy of the Government in all important questions relating to the war. McClellan himself records the fact that Lincoln read the letter in McClellan's presence without comment, and that he never alluded to the subject again. McClellan vigorously protested against the withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula, but the order was peremptory and he obeyed it with obvious reluctance. His personal feeling toward Lincoln and the Administration is clearly exhibited in a letter to his wife written on the 31st of August and published in "McClellan's Own Story," page 532. Speaking of Washington he says: "As a matter of self-respect I can not go there." On the 1st of September, however, he was called to Washington and given a verbal order by Gen. Halleck, then Commander-in-chief, to take charge of the defenses of Washington. On the following morning Lincoln and Halleck called on Gen. McClellan at his house and asked him to take command. McClellan states that Lincoln asked him as a favor to the President to "resume command and do the best that could be done." The same day an order was issued from the War Department by Halleck stating that Maj. Gen. McClellan will have command of the fortifications of Washington and all the troops for the defense of the capital. The manner of the restoration of McClellan to command has given rise to latitudinous dispute, but the short story is that most of the Army of the Potomac had been put under command of Gen. Pope in his disastrous battles of the second Bull Run campaign, and both the armies of McClellan and Pope were compelled to retreat into the Washington defenses in a very demoralized condition.

No man better understood McClellan's value as an organizer and as a defensive commander than Lincoln, and he solved the problem himself by calling McClellan to the new command because he believed the capital to be in danger and McClellan the best man to protect it. If he ever consulted any one on the subject it has never been given to the public in any authentic form. Had he consulted his Cabinet it would have been next to unanimous against giving McClellan any command whatever, and the Administration leaders in both branches of Congress would also have been nearly unanimous in demanding McClellan's dismissal from command. Lincoln acted in this case, as was his custom in all severe trials, on his own personal responsibility, and Lincoln and Lincoln alone is responsible for calling McClellan to command the defenses of Washington, and for permitting McClellan, under that assignment, to take the field for the Antietam campaign without any special orders from the Government. The assumption that Lincoln simply consulted his fears in restoring McClellan to command is an absurdity. There were twenty Generals in the Army of the Potomac and in Pope's army who could have taken command of the complete defenses of Washington, constructed under McClellan's faultless engineering skill, and protected the capital against double the number of men Lee had in his entire army. That McClellan handled the demoralized army better than any other could have done I do not doubt, but that he was a necessity to save the capital is not to be considered for a moment. It is obvious also that Lincoln believed McClellan to be the best man to command the army in the campaign in pursuit of Lee, but he was prudent enough to avoid any specific order to McClellan assigning him to the command. He put McClellan in position to take command to move against Lee, and McClellan, always obedient to what he believed to be his duty, availed himself of it and fought the battle of Antietam.

So far from Lincoln being unfriendly to McClellan when he started on his spring campaign of 1862, there is the strongest evidence in the support of the belief that Lincoln hoped for McClellan's success and earnestly desired him to win his way back as Commander-in-chief of the armies. It was on March 11, 1862, at Lincoln relieved McClellan from his position of Commander-in-chief and limited him to the command of his own immediate army, and no Commander-in-chief was appointed until July 11, 1862. Had Lincoln intended at McClellan should never return to the command of all the armies, he certainly would have appointed Halleck Commander-in-chief before the 11th of July. It is known that Gen. Scott, when he retired from the command, desired the appointment of Halleck as his successor, and McClellan himself was in doubt for some weeks whether Halleck or

himself would be called to the supreme command. After McClellan, Halleck was the one man to whom Lincoln turned as the most competent for Commander-in-chief, but he delayed filling the position not only until after the disastrous close of the Peninsula campaign, but for two weeks after McClellan's insulting letter to Stanton and four days after McClellan's offensive political letter, handed to the President at Harrisson's Landing. It was not until McClellan had proclaimed himself a political as well as a military General on the 7th of July, 1862, that Lincoln abandoned all hope of McClellan ever regaining the position of Commander-in-chief, and four days thereafter he called Halleck to that task. I many times heard Lincoln discuss McClellan. I do not mean that he usually or even at any time expressed fully his views as to McClellan, but I have reason to know that with all the troubles he had with McClellan about moving in the early part of 1862, and about the Peninsula campaign, he sincerely and earnestly hoped that McClellan would capture Richmond and thus re-instate himself as Commander-in-chief of the armies, with his laurels fairly won and his ability to maintain them clearly demonstrated.

If Lincoln had been capable of resentment against McClellan, or against any of his military leaders, many heads would have fallen which were saved by Lincoln's patience and generosity. He knew that McClellan, and more than one other General, had at times listened to the whispers of a military dictatorship. McClellan states, on page 152 of his own book, that Stanton once urged him to arrest Secretary Cameron for inciting to insubordination by making an abolition speech to a newly arrived regiment, and he adds: "He (Stanton) often advocated the propriety of my seizing the Government and taking affairs in my own hands." In a letter to his wife, dated August 9, 1861, also published in his own volume, page 80, McClellan refers to the fact that he is earnestly pressed by letter after letter and conversation after conversation to save the nation by assuming the powers of the President as Dictator. Writing in the free confidence of a devoted husband to a devoted wife he said: "As I hope one day to be united with you forever in heaven I have no such aspiration. I would cheerfully take the dictatorship and agree to lay down my life when the country is saved." Had Lincoln been jealous of McClellan's power he had ample opportunity to relieve him from command long before he did, but he never feared those who prattled about the dictatorship, although well informed of the many, including some prominent Generals, who had advised it. His generosity to military men who committed such follies is clearly exhibited in his letter of January 26, 1863, to Gen. Hooker notifying him of his assignment to the command of the Army of the Potomac. Hooker was one of those who had believed in a military dictatorship, and Lincoln believed that Hooker had not given cordial support to Gen. Burnside when he was in command of the army. To use Lincoln's own plain language, he told Hooker that he had done "a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer." He then said to Hooker: "I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those Generals who gain success can be dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship." Thus did Lincoln assign Hooker to the command of the Army of the Potomac when he knew that Hooker had been guilty of the failure to support his commanding officer in important military movements, and that he had advised a dictator to usurp the prerogatives of the President. He believed McClellan to be in political sympathy with the men who were most implacably hostile to his administration, but he was sagacious enough to know that military success under any General of his appointment would give political success to the administration, and I am certain that he would have preferred McClellan as the conqueror of Richmond in 1862, and would gladly have restored him to the command of all the armies, knowing that the victory would have been as much the victory of Lincoln as the victory of McClellan.

I saw Lincoln many times during the campaign of 1864, when McClellan was his competitor for the presidency. I never heard him speak of McClellan in any other than terms of the highest personal respect and kindness. He never doubted McClellan's loyalty to the Government or to the cause that called him to high military command. But he did believe, until after the capture of Atlanta by Sherman and Sheridan's victories in the Valley, which settled the political campaign in favor of Lincoln, that McClellan was quite likely to be elected over him; and that if elected, with all his patriotism and loyalty to the Union, he would be powerless to prevent the dissolution of the republic. The Convention that nominated McClellan

for President met only a few days before Sherman captured Atlanta. There had been no important victories for any of the Union armies until that time during the year 1864, and there had been great sacrifice of life in both Sherman's and Grant's campaigns. The Convention that nominated McClellan voiced the sentiment that accepted the war as a failure, and it was so declared in the platform in the clearest terms, with the call for a suspension of hostilities because of the failure to obtain peace by force of arms. Lincoln believed that McClellan, if elected, would be coerced into a policy of humiliating peace and the loss of all the great issues for which so much blood and treasure had been sacrificed. But that he ever cherished the semblance of resentment against McClellan, even when McClellan was offensively insubordinate as a military man, and equally offensive in assuming to define the political policy of the Administration, I do not for a moment believe. Had McClellan understood Lincoln half as well as Lincoln understood McClellan, there never would have been serious discord between them. It was the creation of what I believe to be McClellan's entirely unwarranted distrust of Lincoln's personal and official fidelity to him as a military commander, and that single error became a seething cauldron of woe to both of them and a consuming misfortune to McClellan.

Lincoln's position in history is secure, but it is doubtful whether the impartial historian of the future will give McClellan his full measure of justice. History records results—only achievements and failures. It will tell of McClellan that he was an unsuccessful military chieftain, and that on his own record, in an appeal to the country, he was the most overwhelmingly defeated candidate for President in the history of the present great parties of the nation; but no truthful historian can fail to say of him that he was one of the great military geniuses of his day, one of the purest of patriots and one of the most loyal of men in the great battle for the preservation of the Union. A. K. McCLELLAN.

St. Louis Globe Democrat

Jan 24, 1892

WOLSELEY AND MCCLELLAN.

The British general Wolseley has been writing a series of articles on our civil war. In one devoted to the operations of McClellan in his march to Richmond in 1862, Wolseley says: "I entertain the strongest possible belief, which has been confirmed by all the evidence supplied by the Century papers, that for the failure of the Peninsular campaign the administration at Washington was far more to blame than General McClellan." The Chicago Herald, commenting on Wolseley's article, says, "there was a fault on the part of the administration to which he did not allude, and this was the jealousy of Lincoln and Stanton." McClellan, in his "Own Story," invariably speaks respectfully of Lincoln, and W. C. Prime, in his introduction to that work, is not disposed to censure Lincoln, but is merciless in his castigation of Stanton, Chase, and the radical or malignant wing of the republican party. After Antietam the assurances given by Lincoln to "Little Mac" of confidence in his generalship and capacity to command were as full and unreserved as could be given by one man to another. He promised "to stand by McClellan against all sneers." He was undoubtedly sincere at the time, and intended to extend to McClellan every support that he could give as president. When he returned to Washington from the battlefield he was met by a hostility in his cabinet and in leaders of the controlling wing of his party, so fierce and determined that he was compelled to yield. The man could do nothing without their support. They were in control of congress, and were backed by a majority of the republican press. Only a few weeks before, upon giving certain orders to McClellan to defend Washington after the defeat of Pope, Lincoln had been so savagely assaulted in a cabinet meeting by both Chase and Stanton that he said "he would gladly resign." Wolseley's opinion in regard to the Peninsular campaign is of value as that of a competent and impartial critic, but why Richmond was not captured in 1862 must be told by the political rather than the military history of that year. 7.17.1885


"Lincoln felt considerable contempt for officers who fought according to the rules laid down at military schools," said J. J. Rodgers, an old neighbor of the martyred President, now stopping at the Southern. "A young sergeant distinguished himself by his gallantry at Donelson and was recommended for promotion. He was summoned to appear before a military board at Washington and closely questioned by West Point graduates. None of his answers were satisfactory. When the report reached the President I chanced to be present. He fidgeted a moment, laid the paper on his desk, then taking one gaunt knee in his hands, said: 'I don't know what to do with this case. Here's a young fellow who has the stuff in him for a good officer. He's got good horse sense and is full of pluck, but he knows nothing of the science of losing battles. He doesn't even know the technical name of the fortification on which he ran up the stars and stripes in the face of the enemy. Clearly it would be a great scandal to commission a man who kills rebels in such a wretchedly unscientific way, but do you know, Jack (and Lincoln hitched his chair nearer mine and dropped his voice to a confidential tone), do you know that I'm secretly of the opinion that a little more sense and a little less science is what is needed just about now?' He thought a moment, then indorsed the report, 'Give this man a Captain's commission.' A. Lincoln."

1852

General McClellan when in command of the army, conducted a waiting campaign, being so careful not to make any mistakes that he made very little headway. President Lincoln sent this brief but exceedingly pertinent letter: "My Dear McClellan—If you don't want to use the army, I should like to borrow it for awhile. Yours, respectfully,

1857

"A. LINCOLN."



In the above cartoon, McClellan's vanity, his inability to see anybody's problems but his own, was satirized, as well as the popular conception of what was going on in the army.

Lincoln's Appeal to McClellan.

A Pennsylvania brigadier general who served under McClellan in the Army of the Potomac, tells the following story: "When McClellan was nominated for the presidency by the democratic national convention in 1864, President Lincoln wrote him a letter urging him to decline the nomination. In it he said to McClellan that he did not understand how a major general in the service of the United States, who had commanded the Army of the Potomac, could stand on a platform which declared the war a failure."

He thought such a man, knowing there was no possibility of his election, would refuse to run, and would urge the re-election of the president who had conducted the nation through these years of war. He appealed to McClellan to pursue this patriotic course. McClellan thought it over, and was, as I believe, on the point of following Lincoln's advice, when he was persuaded by Samuel J. Tilden and other democratic leaders to accept the nomination and make the race in which he captured 21 electoral votes against the 212 cast for Lincoln.—Philadelphia Record, Oct. 12, 1883.

LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN.

The Latter Kept in Command Because of Public Feeling. 1854

Noah Brooks, in the November Century.

Just before the battle of Chancellorsville I visited the Army of the Potomac, its headquarters being then at Falmouth, in President Lincoln's company. We were detained en route by a storm, and spent one night on board the steamer anchored in the Potomac. In the course of conversation that evening the president was communicative and in a confidential mood, and discussed the military situation with much freedom. Speaking of McClellan, he said: "I kept McClellan in command after I had expected that he would win victories, simply because I knew that his dismissal would provoke popular indignation and shake the faith of the people in the final success of the war." Very soon after the battle of Chancellorsville, and before the battle of Gettysburg was fought, the old rumor of McClellan's recall again got upon its legs, to the great consternation of Lincoln's friends in Washington. This report was more than usually vigorous and plausible. Hooker's failure at Chancellorsville, and the blow which his military prestige had suffered in consequence, gave public opinion a decidedly sharp fillup. One evening, while this rumor was gaining strength, I chanced to be in the family sitting room at the White House, where the president, Mrs. Lincoln and several callers were assembled, when an indiscreet young lady directly attacked Lincoln with the extraordinary question: "Mr. President, is McClellan going to be recalled to the command of the Army of the Potomac?" The president good-naturedly parried this home thrust, but gave no satisfactory answer. Afterward joining in the conversation, I intimated to the president that as he had not settled the matter, there probably might be some ground for the general suspicion that McClellan would be recalled. Lincoln, who sat near me, put on a very severe look, and turning, said in an undertone: "And you, too?" I instantly recalled our conversation on the steamer and apologized for my lack of faith. He then added: "I see you remember the talk we had on the Carrie Martin."

McClellan's Nemesis

A Marked Man, After Stanton Became War Secretary, Who Could Do Nothing to Please.

THE placing of a statue of General George B. McClellan in the Smith Memorial in West Park, recalls anew the troubles of the once popular military chief, whose renown in the early days of the Civil War fired the ardor of the young, as he was presented in many stirring and heroic roles on the pages of the great pictorial weeklies of the period as head of the famous Army of the Potomac.

McClellan emerged from the command of a subordinate division operating in West Virginia, composed of troops recruited in Ohio, where he was living at the time of the outbreak of the war, being connected with the Illinois Central Railroad Company with headquarters at Cincinnati. His command of militia was recruited at Camp Dennison, and was known as the Army of the Department of Ohio.

No military chieftain of the Civil War rose more rapidly in the favor of the President and of the people than General McClellan. There seemed to be a magic about his personality that captivated President Lincoln and everybody else. The war had not progressed more than six months, in which interval was fought the battle of Bull Run, so disastrous to the Northern troops, until it became apparent to the President and Cabinet that the aged commander of the army, Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott, could not sustain the new burdens that would be imposed upon him, a fact which the veteran himself realized, and he asked to be retired. His request was granted, and on the 31st of October, 1861, he resigned and was succeeded by General McClellan.

President Lincoln at once sought the new General's advice as to the conduct of the war, and for weeks he was busy drawing up and submitting memoranda and recommendations to the President. The two were in almost daily consultation. Their close relations and the confidence in which Lincoln held the new commander of the army, continued until a new personality appeared in the War Department. As long as Simon Cameron was Secretary of War General McClellan was much deferred to by the War Office and had practically everything his own way. But he had been commander of the army only a little over two months when Secretary Cameron resigned and was succeeded by the gruff and masterful Edwin M. Stanton. The change took place on the 13th of January, 1862.

Stanton did not like General McClellan's influence over the President, and he was scarcely warm in his seat before he began in his vigorous way to take steps to get the new General out of Washington and into active service in the field. Within exactly nine days after taking office as Secretary of War, on January 22, 1862, he issued an order with the sanction of the President, placing General McClellan in command of the Army of the Potomac and relieving him of his position as General-in-Chief.

Then began the famous Peninsula campaign that resulted so disastrously to the Army of the Potomac in the losses, not by fruitless battles alone, but by fever and other forms of disease contracted in the Southern swamps, which carried away thousands. That McClellan was a marked man whom Stanton had determined to get rid of will be made manifest to anybody who, in these days when the passions of the war have long since subsided, will take the trouble to read the despatches from the War Department to McClellan, not alone from Stanton direct, but from Major-General Halleck, whom he installed in McClellan's old place at Washington under the varying titles of Commander of the Armies and Chief of Staff. McClellan was kept in a nervous state continually by the despatches from the War Office. Whenever he was ready to strike a blow there would come an order for him to desist. Whenever he would win a victory in the long and elaborate manoeuvres there would be an urgent despatch ordering him not to pursue his advantage further. Finally, after the loss of a large number of men from war and disease directly after the battle of Fair Oaks, when he was within sight of the spires of Richmond, embarrassing orders came which crippled his army and caused him to feel that the War Department did not wish him to capture Richmond. The matter enabled General Lee

then newly appointed as the successor of General Albert Sidney Johnston, who had been killed, to centre his different corps at Richmond and to assume the aggressive. It was then McClellan received orders from Stanton to withdraw his entire army to a new base.

But it was not until after the battle of Savage Station, on the 28th of June, 1862, that McClellan's spirit could no longer brook the slights and faultfindings he had suffered from Stanton, and he sent this heartbroken despatch. This was the last that ever passed between the two men, as Stanton never forgave him, and thereafter left all orders to McClellan to be transmitted by General Halleck or the President himself:—

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, Savage Station, June 28, 1862—12.20 A. M. —I now know the whole history of the day . . . our men did all that soldiers could do, but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers soon after I had brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most desperate battle of the war. The sad remnants of my men behave as men—those battalions who fought most bravely and suffered most are still in the best of order. Had I 20,000 or even 10,000 fresh troops to use tomorrow I could take Richmond. But I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and personnel of the army. If we have lost the day we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need blush for the Army of the Potomac.

I feel too earnestly tonight; I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the Government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now the game is lost. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army.

From the hour Stanton received this despatch there was never any more communication either verbal or written between him and McClellan. Stanton was a good hater, and his enmity to McClellan was now fixed and lasting for the remainder of his life.

The Army of the Potomac was brought back to Northern Virginia, landing at Alexandria, and was split up into several commands, with General Pope at the head. McClellan was simply ignored and left in ignorance of what his status was. He was a General lingering around Washington without a command. This continued until the second battle of Bull Run was fought, and the army received another severe defeat. Then Lee, flushed with his triumph, pushed on with the design of carrying the war into Maryland and effecting the alliance of that State with the States of the Confederacy.

President Lincoln became alarmed and took a firm attitude toward Stanton. He ordered McClellan to take command again of the defeated and dispirited army. McClellan gladly resumed his old place, and amidst the plaudits of his soldiers led the Army of the Potomac forward, met Lee at Antietam, and in a terrible battle there won a complete victory, hurling the Southern army back, shattered, dismayed and dispirited.

But McClellan was not allowed any peace, even in view of this triumph. His army after the battle was almost naked, the soldiers not even having shoes for their feet. The War Department said it was forwarding him the needed supplies, and he waited for them at Harper's Ferry. But they did not come. Weeks passed and scores of telegrams were interchanged between the army and Washington, but it was not until over a month had passed that the supplies were finally located in cars at Hagerstown.

By the time the men were equipped Lee had thoroughly recovered from his defeat and was ready again for the field. Meantime McClellan, instead of receiving congratulations over his victory, was continuously besieged with carping despatches. At length in his despair of having justice done him at the War Department, he sent this despatch to Halleck:—

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, near Sharpsburg, Sept. 20, 1862, 8 P. M. —Major-General Halleck, General-in-Chief: Your telegram of today is received. I telegraphed you yesterday all I knew, and had nothing more to inform you of until this evening. I regret that you find it necessary to couch every despatch I have the honor to receive from you in a spirit of fault-finding, and that you have not yet found leisure to say one word in commendation of the recent achievements of this army or even to allude to them.

General McClellan was absolutely right in his statement that not a word had come from the War Department or from any other high quarter in Washington commending him or his army for the

great victory at Antietam. A studied policy of avoiding the expression of any word of praise for him, no matter how great the service he might render the country, seems to have been adopted by the War Department.

In General Halleck, Stanton found a willing and subservient instrument in carrying out his line of action against those generals whom he disliked. After Hooker had resigned from the command of the Army of the Potomac, at Frederick, Maryland, four days before the battle of Gettysburg, or on the 27th of June, 1863, despite the fact that he had handled the army with such consummate skill in his pursuit of Lee from the Rappahannock, interposing between the Confederates and the capital, and thus saving it, he was arrested by Halleck, with the assent of Stanton, a few days after his resignation, for visiting Washington without permission of the War Department, which had formulated a rule forbidding army officers from doing so without having received the department's sanction. While it is true Hooker was at once paroled and ordered not to leave the capital without the consent of the Secretary of War (whose presence he had merely sought in order to be assigned to some other command), the indignity was nevertheless put upon him and showed how small those at the head of the War Office could be when they wished to visit displeasure on generals they disliked.

McClellan's complaint to Halleck in the despatch quoted was caused by a series of fault-finding communications after his victory at Antietam, the last of which, from Halleck, read thus:—

We are still entirely in the dark in regard to your own movements and those of the enemy. This should not be so. You should keep me advised of both so far as you know them.

When it is stated this fault-finding despatch came to McClellan on the 20th of September, 1862, three days after he had won Antietam and freed the soil of Maryland from the enemy, as well as saved Pennsylvania from an invasion (for Antietam is only a few miles from Hagerstown, almost within sight of the Keystone State's border), the extent of the feeling with which the War Department was permeated toward McClellan will be realized.

In less than six weeks after the battle of Antietam, or on the 7th of November, 1862, McClellan was relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac and ordered to turn it over to General Burnside. The latter's disastrous experience as McClellan's successor culminating in the worst defeat the Northern troops had yet sustained in any battle thus far in the war, the bloody battle of Fredericksburg, on the Rappahannock, a little over a month later, in the chill of December, when thousands of the boys in blue were slaughtered in the hopeless attempt to capture Marye's Heights, is familiar history. It was a disaster which caused Burnside immediately to resign, to be succeeded by Hooker, whose bane came just before Gettysburg, as stated, when he was succeeded by Meade, who somehow or other was allowed by the War Department to fight and win the battle of Gettysburg on July 1, 2 and 3, 1863, despite the fact that the department's constant intermeddling had caused the Army of the Potomac to be wittily described as "the graveyard of generals."

V. G.

How Lincoln Met Gen. McClellan

A Hitherto Unpublished Story



LOOKING back over the records of the Civil War, and noting the constant clash of policies and politics, of opinions and ambitions, which marked its course, one is sometimes tempted to wonder, not so much that it was brought to a close in four years, as that it ever ended at all in a victory for the Union arms. President Lincoln, who stood at the focal point where all the lines crossed, must have suffered a terrible tax not only on his patriotism and his patience, but on his diplomatic resourcefulness as well. As we commonly have him represented to us, it is as the modest, but ultimately triumphant, overcomer of obstacles. But the war era bore for him also its crop of humiliations, and one of the most serious of these occurred in the fall of 1862, when, in order to assure the safety of the National Capital he had to bow his head to a military man whom he had practically retired from active service because of their disagreements.

All through the earlier part of the year, the President, Secretary Stanton and Generals Halleck and McClellan had kept up a fire of missives of remonstrance and rebuke. Back of the administration was a press eager for thrilling news and a public which knew as little of war, for the most part, as of the differential calculus, and whose one idea of an army was a body of men equipped with weapons of various sorts, who could march and fight without food or sleep, if need be, for an indefinite period. Many enthusiastic patriots were sure that the war had already lasted twice as long as was necessary. Under goading from these sources, the President and his Secretary of War, however well they might understand the reasons for McClellan's deliberateness, felt themselves forced to urge him on, lest the support of the people of the North who were recruiting the volunteer regiments, and of the men of means who were financing the Government's operations, should weaken through lack of confidence. McClellan kept insisting on more troops, and more time to get them ready for effective action. But the clamor was so great that the President, on at least one occasion, after convening a council of war and finding that twelve of the twenty officers composing it agreed with McClellan, threw overboard their decision and issued peremptory orders himself in defiance thereof. Sometimes the correspondence between Washington and the field became positively acrimonious, as where, after describing the slaughter at Gaines' Mill, McClellan telegraphed Stanton:

"Had I twenty thousand, or even ten thousand, fresh troops to use tomorrow, I could take Richmond. I have lost the battle because my force was too small. . . . I am not responsible for this. If I save the army, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you, or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice the army." Or where Halleck, after attempting to direct from Washington the movements of McClellan's subordinates in northeastern Virginia, wound up a dispatch in this style: "Our people must move more actively, and find out where the enemy is. I am tired of guessing."

Meanwhile, Pope had been assigned to command all the troops gathered for the defense of Washington, who had been made into what was known as the Army of Virginia. With the end of August came also the end of his brief campaign, which he had begun with a proclamation declaring the war to have been conducted on too lenient lines, and announcing that he should change all that. These utterances were interpreted as a severe reflection on McClellan, and the friends of the latter attributed them to political jealousy. With the disastrous rout at the Second Battle of Bull Run, Pope's pride was badly broken, and his army moved rapidly northward. The exultant Confederates prepared to threaten Washington on the west with a small force, while the main body of their army was to move up, under cover of this feint, into Maryland and Pennsylvania, capture Philadelphia and Baltimore and descend upon Washington.

McClellan, who had been stripped of all except the outward insignia of his once high military importance, had come on to Washington, and was staying in the brick and brownstone house which used to stand on the present site of the Shoreham Hotel, at the corner of Fifteenth and H streets. There his staff had been directed to report to him on the morning of September 2. They arrived while the General was still at breakfast. Among them was John W. Wilson, now a Brigadier General, retired. At that time he was a youth of 24, a lieutenant in the corps of topographical engineers attached to McClellan's staff. The officers were ushered into the room on the left of the entrance hall, opposite the parlor, and there awaited the coming of their chief. Lieutenant Wilson amused himself by looking out of the window, which commanded a view of H street for a block or so in either direction. Presently he announced to his colleagues that he had seen President Lincoln and General Halleck, General-in-Chief of the Armies of

the United States, walking up what is

now Madison place, evidently on their way from the White House to the Arlington Hotel. It was an unusual hour for dignitaries like these to be abroad for any purpose but one of emergency, and their errand excited some curiosity among the assembled group. Another glance from the window showed that instead of crossing to the Arlington the two men had turned down the north side of H street and were approaching; and a moment later they had ascended the steps of the McClellan house and rung the bell.

Everyone in the room was so silent that, with the door into the hall standing ajar, the officers could hear the President's inquiry for General McClellan, and the butler's response as he bowed the callers into the parlor opposite and returned to the breakfastroom to announce them to his master. Wilson expected that the General would drop everything and hurry out to welcome so distinguished a brace of visitors; but he was mistaken. After the unjust treatment he felt he had received from the Administration, McClellan was in no mood for displaying any enthusiasm over this morning call. He went on with his breakfast, doubtless doing a good deal of thinking the while, and not until he had entirely finished did he rise and proceed at his ordinary pace to the parlor.

None of the officers was disposed to eavesdropping, but the sound of the conversation in the parlor, with the alternate rise and fall of the three voices and the marked emphasis put upon one and another point under discussion, showed them that all parties engaged in it were deeply in earnest. Finally came a lull, when the tones of all dropped to the usual level, and in a few minutes the General emerged with his guests, accepted and shook hands with apparent cordiality their proffered hands, and held the door open for them to depart. Then, walking into the room where his staff was waiting, with a look of serious satisfaction on his face, but in a quiet tone, he said:

"Gentlemen—I have just been assigned by the President to command the united armies for the defense of Washington."

This announcement he followed with instructions to the several officers before him. To Wilson fell the task of going out into Virginia to convey to Pope the news of his supersession. He rode nearly to Fairfax Courthouse before coming up with the defeated officer. Pope was naturally chagrined at the intelligence, but received it without audible comment.

McClellan assumed command at once, and entered upon the campaign which culminated in the Battle of Antietam and his final retirement from the center of the martial stage, a few weeks later.

The incident is still a vivid picture in the memory of General Wilson, having occurred while he was at a very impressionable age; and its historical value resides in the fact that the common practice of Presidents is so different from that pursued by Mr. Lincoln. The usual preliminary to a conference between a President and one of his subordinates is a message requesting the presence of the latter at the White House, where it is the President who keeps him waiting, not he the President. General McClellan was too generous-minded a man ever to gloat over his triumph, and too good a custodian of confidences to prate of what occurred at that interview in the H street parlor; but later events gave a cue to indicate that in the little while he sat at his breakfast table while his two superiors in office cooled their heels in an outer room, he turned over in his mind the possible purpose of their visit, and decided upon the terms he was to exact of them as an element in his impending vindication.

F. E. L.

Brooklyn Eagle
2/12/1913

WHEN M'CLELLAN MADE LINCOLN WAIT

A Hitherto Untold but Dramatic
Incident of War With the
South

HE DEFENDED WASHINGTON

Looking back over the records of the Civil War, and noting the constant clash of policies and politics, of opinions and ambitions, which marked its course, one is sometimes tempted to wonder, not so much that it was brought to a close in four years, as that it ever ended at all in a victory for the Union, says the "Washington Star."

President Lincoln, who stood at the focal point where all the lines crossed, must have suffered a terrible tax, not only on his patriotism and his patience, but on his diplomatic resourcefulness as well. As we commonly have him represented to us, it is as the modest, but ultimately triumphant, overcomer of obstacles.

But the war era bore for him also its crop of humiliations; and one of the most serious of these occurred in the fall of 1862, when, in order to assure the safety of the National Capital, he had to bow his head to a military man whom he had practically retired from active service because of their disagreements.

All through the earlier part of the year, the President, Secretary Stanton and Generals Halleck and McClellan had kept up a fire of missives of remonstrance and rebuke. Back of the administration was a press eager for thrilling news and a public which knew as little of war, for the most part, as of the differential calculus, and whose one idea of an army was a body of men equipped with weapons of various sorts, who could march and fight without food or sleep, if need be, for an indefinite period. Many enthusiastic patriots were sure that the war had already lasted twice as long as was necessary. Under goading from these sources, the President and Secretary of War, however well they might understand the reasons for McClellan's deliberations, felt themselves forced to urge him on, lest the support of the people of the north who were recruiting the volunteer regiments, and of the men of means who were financing the government's operations, should weaken through lack of confidence.

DEFENCE OF WASHINGTON.

McClellan kept insisting on more troops and more time to get them ready for effective action. But the clamor was so great that the President on at least one occasion, after convening a council of war and finding that twelve of the twenty officers composing it agreed with McClellan, threw overboard their decision and issued peremptory orders himself in defiance thereof. Sometimes the correspondence between Washington and the field became positively acrimonious, as when, after describing the slaughter at James Mill, McClellan telegraphed Stanton:

"Had I 20,000 or even 10,000 fresh troops to use to-morrow I could take Richmond. I have lost the battle because my force was too small. . . . I am not responsible for this. If I save the army I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice the army." Or where Halleck, after attempting to direct from Washington the movements of McClellan's subordinates in northeastern Virginia, wound up a dispatch in this style: "Our people must move more actively and find out where the enemy is. I am tired of guessing."

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The officers were ushered into the room on the left of the entrance hall, opposite the parlor, and there awaited the coming of their chief. Lieutenant Wilson amused himself by looking out of the window, which commanded a view of H st. for a block or so in either direction. Presently he announced to his colleagues that he had seen President Lincoln and General Halleck, general-in-chief of the armies of the United States, walking up what is now Madison place, evidently on their way from the White House to the Arlington Hotel.

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M'CLELLAN IN NO HURRY.

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WILSON CARRIES POPE NEWS.

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The incident is still a vivid picture in the memory of General Wilson, having occurred while he was at a very impressionable age; and its historical value resides in the fact that the common practice of Presidents is so different from that pursued by Mr. Lincoln. The usual preliminary to a conference between a President and one of his subordinates is a message requesting the presence of the latter at the White House, where it is the President who keeps him waiting, not he the President.

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1915

THE
MONTH
1861

Pope. He arrived near Manassas in the first week of September, two days late for Second Bull Run; and his commander, Porter, was accused by Pope of failure to carry out orders, and was cashiered (reinstated twenty-five years later). Mid-month Dana missed Antietam (or Sharpsburg) also, and it seemed the fire-eater was going to go through the war absent from all the big shows, or so he feared.

On October 4, 1862, he wrote from Sharpsburg, Maryland (the field of Antietam): "President Lincoln reviewed our Corps yesterday. Little Mac attended him, and the men were therefore crazy as usual." Dana was a fervid McClellan man, but Little Mac continued to be a slow coach and in November was replaced by Burnside. In a letter from Fredericksburg on November 29, Dana describes McClellan's farewell to his army:

"It was a sad, sad day that saw him whom we so idolized . . . taken away, and his farewell review was like a solemn funeral ceremony. Thousands of men & officers sobbing. . . . And he! riding along so proudly, feeling as he must have that but one word from him would place him firmly in his former position, or even in that of 'Military Dictator.' But far too noble was he for any such thought. 'Stand by Burnside,' said he . . . 'as you have stood by me. . . . But regrets . . . are useless—he is gone from us, and we shall not hear his voice again, till it comes from the Presidential chair, where he will sit as surely as 1864 comes round.'"

Thus "the jaunty little man on the great black horse," as Bruce Catton (*Mr. Lincoln's Army*) calls him, left Burnside to fight the Battle of Fredericksburg in mid-December. Dana rode, walked, and ran back from a Washington mission to get into the latter part of the battle, of which he wrote in pencil (5 A.M., Dec. 16): "Thank Heavens I got here in time to join our regt. & go in. . . . I am again in charge of a company (A)." After the battle, on the 17th, he wrote a rousing battle-letter, sanguinary enough to turn his parents' hair gray: "I was positive that I should never cross the field alive, as it seemed to my inexperience as tho a flea could not escape without losing some feathers on both sides. . . . I had picked up a rifle, & finding it loaded, fired it, & then walked up to Col. Parker, who was safe & sound & cool as a cucumber, & reported myself for duty, rifle in hand. How he laughed!" The Feds occupied Fredericksburg, but failed to hold the



THE LINCOLNIAN

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No. 4

Editor: Bert Sheldon

Publications Committee: Josephine Cobb, Elden E. Billings,
Carlton J. Corliss, John L. Fenton, Paul H. Gantt, Mrs. Anna
V. Hausman, Cassius M. Keller, Hon. Fred Schwengel

LINCOLN GROUP MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, November 12, 1958

TIME: 8:00 P. M.

PLACE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

AUDITORIUM -- 23 Madison Place, N. W. See

instructions on page 2.

PROGRAM: (1) Report on "Lincoln-Day-by-Day" Project;

(2) Report on Lincoln "Envelope" Project;

(3) Vote on resolution to "create a Life
Membership in the Lincoln Group" at \$50

dues, sponsored by President Schwengel;

(4) INQUEST into events of November 13, 1861

(a) Did Gen. McClellan snub Lincoln? For back ground see Hay Diary or
Angle, The Lincoln Reader (1947), p. 378.

(b) If the incident took place, did it take place in the Dolly Madison
Home adjacent to the auditorium where our meeting takes place?

(c) Was the Dolly Madison Home the residence or the headquarters of General McClellan in 1861?

MODERATOR: Gen. U. S. Grant III (ret.)

ADVOCATES: Paul H. Gantt; Paul J. Sedgwick

WITNESSES: Elden E. (Josh) Billings; Cassius
M. Keller; Bert Sheldon, and others.

JURY: 12 experienced Lincolnists, historians, and scholars.

* * *

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has graciously consented to let us use their Auditorium, which is located back of the Dolly Madison Home. Please enter the auditorium through the parking lot which is located next to the old Belasco Theatre (USO) on Madison Place. Please do not stray away from the Auditorium. All facilities are located nearby.

* * *

TRIP TO GETTYSBURG ** NOVEMBER 15

The Ladies of the Grand Army of the Republic, with our Corresponding Secretary, Mrs. Anna V. Hausman, as Chairman, will charter a bus for members and friends to attend the Second Annual Remembrance Day in honor of the passing of the Grand Army of the Republic, at the Woolson Statue on the battlefield in Gettysburg, Pa. on Saturday, November 15 at 2:30 P. M. All members of the Lincoln Group are invited. Please send check per \$3.50 to Mrs. Hausman if you like to attend. For specifics call Mrs. Hausman at EMerson 3-0535.

* * *

The Lincoln Sesquicentennial Commission and the Civil War Centennial Commission have made available to us the "Handbook of Information" (40 pp.) and a speech by Senator Thurmond on Lincoln. We will distribute these items at the November 12 meeting.



Next meeting -- Wednesday, November 12th -- of Lincoln Group promises to be unusual, interesting.

Please come. Have a "Show Me" attitude. You will not be disappointed. But, come. Come and see.

We shall have a "Moot Court" or "Mock Trial" with Major General U. S. Grant III as His Honor The Judge. Paul Gantt, Executive Vice President of L. G., is Legal Advisor to and Friend Of The Court, Cross Examiner of witnesses, and Parliamentarian. Sharing that task -- with some slightly different responsibilities is Paul Sedgwick. Both Messrs. Sedgwick and Gantt are members of the D.C. Bar, both are extremely well-read students of Civil War and Lincoln history. We are fortunate, and grateful for having all three of these well known, highly respected gentlemen to direct our activity -- Wednesday, November 12th.

We'd sure like to have you with us that date. Be sure to come. This exciting program, this gala evening will justify your coming.

Twelve jurors will be chosen from professional historians, research experts, reference librarians, and outstanding students of Civil War and local Washington, D. C. history. Our list is not yet complete.

Come, see what we are doing. We shall do a better job with you present to encourage us. We need you -- Wednesday evening, 8 P.M., November 12.

The "Moot Court" question to be decided is: Exactly where on November 13, 1861 did General McClellan snub President Lincoln? Everybody reads of the incident, where in this city did it happen? The location has never been decided. Historians referring to it make no mention of its location.

Put on your war paint, your best bonnet. We promise not to bore you, not to take up a collection, and to let you go home reasonably early -- O.K. ?

We have a letter from a history professor, author of a recent biography of McClellan, who questions whether the incident ever happened.

Favor us with your important presence. Let's put on a better show with your help -- help by being present.

Some evidence indicates the rude snubbing incident may have happened in Dolly Madison's house on H Street on S.W. corner of Madison Place. We had planned, had hoped, to hold our meeting in the building where some of us think the incident occurred, on the exact anniversary. We can't.

There is no room large enough in the old stucco residence of President Madison's widow. Also, General Grant is unable to be with us on the exact anniversary date. We are missing the exact anniversary date by exactly one day in order to have General Grant on November 12th. We prefer it this way. We are honored by his presence.

A lot of care and preparation has gone into planning for this meeting -- it's different.

We meet in the taller building which adjoins old Cosmos Club on the south, faces Madison Place. We are close enough in point of both time and location to have substantially authentic historic atmosphere.

We have approximately two hundred fifty L. G. members, let's each one be there. Put your foot in the path Wednesday, November 12th for a handsome evening. You will be glad you came.

There will be some important business to transact regarding sale of our Lincoln Day By Day project for \$2,500.00. You really must come. Be sure. Be there.

Eagerly, Respectfully,

Your Program Committee for this event.

Trial Goes Back 97 Years to Solve a Lincoln Mystery

By J. F. TER HORST
Of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON, Nov. 14. —Devotees of Abraham Lincoln held a full-dress court trial beside historic Dolley Madison House here and finally fixed the scene of an old crime against their hero.

The verdict: That George



PRESIDENT LINCOLN

b. McClellan, a general of the Union Army, did insult one Abraham Lincoln, the same being President of these United States, in the Dolley Madison House.

The time: 97 years ago yesterday.

The little-noticed trial was held Tuesday night in a former stable adjoining Dolley's house at H street and Madison in northwest Washington.

Acting as judge was retired Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant III, a leader of a band known locally as the Lincoln Group, a sort of fan club for Lincoln.

Twelve historians, research experts and Civil War buffs composed the jury. And two members of the Lincoln Group served as opposing attorneys.

For years, it seems, Lincoln admirers have known that the haughty McClellan had snubbed his commander in chief. But no one has ever determined exactly where it happened, a mystery that has agitated historians.

See LINCOLN—Page 17



GEN. MCCLELLAN

So they took it to trial in the former stable, which by day houses part of the government's National Aeronautic and Space Agency (NASA).

The first piece of evidence was a photostatic copy of John Hay's diary for Nov. 13, 1861, in which Hays said: "I wish here to record a portent of evil things to come."

GOES TO BED

Hays wrote that he and Lincoln were waiting at Gen. McClellan's quarters to see the general when McClellan came in, walked by the open door, went upstairs to bed and sent down word that he wasn't coming down.

This sort of established the crime. But not the scene.

Then Cassius Marcellus Clay Keller, amateur historian, took the stand and became the star witness.

He quoted a letter from McClellan to his wife on Aug. 13, 1861, saying he was "living . . . in Commodore Wilk's house" off Jackson Square.

WITNESS DIFFERS

Everybody present knew that the Dolley Madison House was later the commodore's house.

An opposing witness, Charles Dorman of the Smithsonian Institution, produced a Congressional Directory of 1861 which fixed McClellan's residence at a spot several blocks away.

On top of all this came an additional bit of information. Since McClellan was returning from a wedding party for one of his officers, could he have been drunk and not really intending to snub the President?

VERDICT GIVEN

The jurors finally retired to deliberate, laden with bits of historical data, gossip and diary matter. Considerably later, they returned with the verdict.

The snub, the jury decided, did occur at the Dolley Madison House on the date aforesaid. They hoped the opposition would have "broad tolerance" for their decision.

But the court left unanswered the question of whether McClellan was in his cups or as sober as a saber.

LINCOLN GROUP HAS A GO AT EGO

Well, Anyway, George Did It

By TOM KELLY

Just 97 years ago today that haughty egotist Gen. George B. McClellan snubbed the long, lean and humble President Abraham Lincoln.

And he did it in the stucco house that still stands at the corner of H-st and Madison Place nw.

Or at any rate the Lincoln Group — a band of devoted Lincoln fans — decided last night that Gen. George was guilty and that the Dolly Madison House was the scene of the crime.

AGITATING

The snubbing has been agitating the Lincoln Group.

It has been cited often over the years, but no one ever said exactly where.

Last night the whole thing came to trial in an impromptu court in the former stable of the Cameron House which adjoins the Madison House and which is more ordinarily occupied by the National Aeronautic Space Agency.

Gen. U. S. Grant 3d sat as judge and Paul Gantt and Paul Sedgwick of the Lincoln Group were opposing attorneys. The jury consisted of 12 District historians, research specialists, and Civil War students.

WITNESSES

A lot of witnesses were called, including one of the jurors, and each was armed with reference books.

Mr. Sedgwick opened by introducing a photostatic copy of John Hay's diary for Nov. 13, 1861 in which he said: "I wish here to record a portent of evil things to come."

He said he and the President were waiting at Gen. McClellan's quarters to see



This photo of Gen. McClellan (left) and President Lincoln was made a year after the snubbing incident, at the bloody battle of Antietam—a battle in which the sentiment was that the General didn't do as well as he might have done. Next to Mr. Lincoln is Gen. George Custer, who was killed by the Sioux in 1876.

him when the General came in, walked by the open door ignoring them, went upstairs to bed and eventually sent

down word that he wouldn't see them.

Where did it happen? (Everybody admitted last night that it had.) Cassius Marcellus Clay Keller, an amateur historian and a star witness, quoted a letter from Gen. McClellan to his wife, dated Aug. 13, 1861, saying he was "living . . . in Commodore Wilk's house," off Jackson Square. Everybody present knew that the Dolly Madison House was later the Commodore's house.

DIRECTORY

But an opposing witness Charles Dorman, of the Smithsonian, produced the Congressional Directory of 1861, which showed that Gen. McClellan's residence was at 15th and H-st nw. He also produced an original drawing by a Civil War soldier showing that McClellan's military headquarters were at 19th and Pennsylvania-av in a building now a People's Drug Store which is being torn down.

An incidental question came up.

Since Gen. McClellan was returning from a wedding at the time of the snub, was it possible that he was drunk and hadn't meant to snub the President at all?

After many another witnesses and quotations the jurors retired.

They returned, none too promptly, to announce that with the "broad tolerance" of the minority, they decided Gov. McClellan did snub Lincoln in the Madison House on Nov. 13, 1861.

They adjourned, leaving the question of whether or not he was drunk up in the air.



Lincoln Lore

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Number 1680

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY: A RESPECTABLE MINORITY?

Although much of the drama of the Lincoln Presidency has always stemmed from descriptions of his struggles with opposition on the home front, careful studies of the nature of the opposition itself have been few indeed. Understanding the precise nature of the opposition to Lincoln is critical for understanding Lincoln himself. To realize the importance of this, one need only recall the difference in accounts of Lincoln's Presidency written in times when the Democrats were viewed principally as Copperheads and those written in times when the Democratic opposition was thought to be mostly a loyal opposition. Joel Silbey has now provided a comprehensive look at the Democratic party in the Civil War era. *A Respectable Minority: The Democratic Party in the Civil War Era, 1860-1868* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977) describes the history of the opposition, as it were, from the inside, not from the perspective of the Lincoln administration.

In the turmoil of the 1850s, when the Republican party was born, the Democrats lost enough voters to become a minority party. In 1861, they would also lose their greatest national leader, Stephen Douglas. Though there was no way for the leaders to know it, the party had taken the bulk of the losses it would suffer for several decades to come. The Democratic party was in 1860, on the threshold of the Civil War, a somewhat shrunken, but coherent body. It was now a minority party, but it was "a respectable minority" which could depend upon steadily turning out a substantial body of voters for any election. Such was the way the party looked from the outside.

Internally, the party's history did show some dynamics of change and fluctuation. When war broke out in 1861, the impulse of most Democrats was to rally around the flag. "I am with you in this contest," said Fernando Wood, who would become a highly partisan opponent of Republican war policies later. "I know no party now." Stephen Douglas was ready even before Sumter "to make any reasonable sacrifice of party tenets to save the country." After Sumter, Silbey writes, "he

was quoted as favoring the immediate hanging of Southern sympathizers in the District of Columbia unless they repented their treason; and he pled to his party in his last speech to help rescue the country first and think about partisan differences later." Republicans were flabbergasted and delighted. Lincoln exploited the party honeymoon by appointing Democrat Edwin Stanton Secretary of War, and in various states Republicans promoted Union parties to ignore previous partisan identifications. They succeeded for a time. "In many places," says Silbey, "Democratic local and state conventions, the supreme policy-articulating and electoral-organizing units of the party, stopped meeting throughout 1861 and into early 1862, even on such sacred party days as the eighth of January, the anniversary of Andrew Jackson's victory at New Orleans."

Gradually, Republican measures which squinted towards emancipation and which restricted civil liberties revived Democratic partisanship. A small body of Democrats, the so-called War Democrats, parted ways with the mass of Democrats at this point — a movement which Silbey is at a loss to explain. In March, 1862, Clement Vallandigham arranged a meeting of Democratic members of Congress which published a partisan "Address . . . To the Democracy of the United States" in May. This call to the party colors rejected absorption of the Democrats and revived the opposition. Candidates chosen in this new spirit did rather well in the fall elections of 1862, aided in good measure by Lincoln's issuance of the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in September.

As always, success bred factionalism. By 1863, the Democrats were split between groups which Silbey calls "Legitimists" and "Purists." Following distinctions made by political scientist Austin Ranney in *To Cure the Mischief of Faction: Party Reform in America*, Silbey argues that parties are usually split between a group which takes primarily a "competitive" view of the functions of the party and a



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FIGURE 1. In 1864, Republicans attacked Democratic candidate George B. McClellan in two ways. First, they made him guilty by association with his Vice-Presidential running mate, George Pendleton, who was identified with the peace wing of the party (see FIGURE 3 in *Lincoln Lore* Number 1679). Second, they could undermine his personal embodiment of pro-war sentiment by making him appear a worthless general. In this caricature reproduced as a *carte-de-visite* for parlor albums, the latter strategy dictated McClellan's ridiculous appearance as a general with a paper hat on a wooden horse.

group which takes essentially an "expressive" view. The former head always for the center of the ideological spectrum in order to attract as many voters as possible to the party. The latter feel more compelled to enunciate the party's principles articulately and loudly. The Democratic Legitimists wished to make it always clear that the party was a legitimate opposition, that they did not flirt with treason, and that they were fully as patriotic as the Republicans. The Democratic Purists were nervous about abandoning cherished party traditions and beliefs in a search for "legitimacy" in the eyes of the centrist voter. They did not want to degenerate into a "me-too" war party.

In 1863, the Purists — most students of the Civil War period know them as the Peace men — were in the ascendant. Electoral gains in the previous year, continuing failure to have decisive military success, and continuing restraints on civil liberties along with emancipation and Negro soldiers put those who wished to express opposition in a position to dictate nominations in Connecticut (Thomas Seymour), in Pennsylvania (George Woodward), and in Ohio (Vallandigham). Legitimists like Samuel Sullivan "Sunset" Cox felt gloomy, and their predictions proved to be accurate: the Democrats lost all three of these gubernatorial elections.

Failure of the Purists gave the Legitimists the advantage for the 1864 Presidential nomination. George McClellan was the perfect Legitimist candidate: he was a general and a good Democrat. Purists were not as enthusiastic; they did not care for having a general head the ticket, and especially a general who had suppressed civil liberties in the border states early in the war. The party may have been near a split, but, as election day neared, both sides decided "there was too much at stake to quarrel." The Democrats struggled with the perpetual problem of American political parties: what works to get the nomination is often the opposite of what will work thereafter to win the election. Thus S.S. Cox wrote McClellan about his West Point speech, a strong endorsement of the war, warning him that it "will give you the election, but it does not help . . . the nomination." Cox advised that he should say something about "the necessity of using all rational methods at every honorable chance for peace and union." This was needed, not for his election, but "for his nomination."

It is not clear whether agreement was reached before the Chicago convention to have a war candidate and a peace platform, but many suspected such would be the case — and it was. For the first time since 1844, Silbey points out, the Democratic platform did not invoke the usual litany about economic questions such as the tariff, banks, and land distribution. It stressed the failure of the war and the precarious state of constitutional liberties.

McClellan lost, of course, in what was, in terms of the electoral vote, a landslide. But Silbey is careful to point out that the Democrats remained about as competitive as they had been since 1860. In fact, the stability of Democratic competitiveness in this era is one of the principal themes of the book and surely one of Silbey's original contributions. He compiles an index of competitiveness for each state, an index which is based on how much the runner-up needs to overcome the winner. Silbey finds the Democrats rather competitive in the belt of states from New York to Illinois which decided national elections. So competitive were they that there may have been considerable wisdom in the Republican efforts to admit solidly Republican Western states in the Union and control the returns from Border States by military intimidation. Silbey believes with most political historians that a "party's popular vote was not built from different segments of the population in successive elections but primarily from the same groups of people as in the election before." Therefore, in 1862, Republican turnout fell more than Democratic turnout:

in other words, Democratic success was built on Republican stay-at-homes. The Democratic disaster of 1863 was, in fact, a one-state disaster: Vallandigham's attempt to become Governor of Ohio caused a Republican landslide in that state, but elsewhere the Democrats were only a little off their very good percentages of the previous year. In addition, they performed rather well, though still losing, with peace candidates in Connecticut and Pennsylvania. Silbey relies on correlations with previous elections and on checks of reversals at the county level to see whether Democratic turnout was normal and whether the geography of partisan advantage changed radically.

In 1864, the Democrats' new-found unity (they had not run as a united national party for some time) did not bring them success. Relying again on the work of political scientists, this time Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes in *Elections and the Political Order*, Silbey argues that the Democrats were victims of "valence" issues rather than "position" issues. No particular and specific policy recommendation made the Democrats too unpopular to win. Valence issues, the linking of parties "with some condition that is positively or negatively valued by the electorate," were their downfall. Silbey's chapter title tells the whole tale: "The Smell of Treason Was on Their Garments."

Silbey makes a virtue of the Democrats' consistency. He argues that they never really pursued a minority party strategy, despite their minority status after 1860. Vote-maximization was a goal pursued only within the confines of party identity. Their unity was built of inherited prejudices and loyalties and of consistent ideological orientation.

At one point, Silbey explains that he "made no effort to delineate precisely the numbers in each group or the nature of the socioeconomic and/or psychological elements shaping individual commitment to one group or another. This needs to be done and should be, building through state-level studies toward a national synthesis. Again, however, what is critical for my purposes is that such divisions existed and helped shape the behavior of a minority party seeking to recover control of the political process. Therefore, though the precise components of the various internal groups which were the sources of the shaping is an important matter, in sketching in a general strategic and tactical picture such description becomes somewhat less relevant I believe." And he warns in his preface that his is "an anatomy of party history, an attempt to provide a framework for understanding by sketching the landscape over which the Democrats had to travel, the nature of the partisan network of leaders and voters, and their perceptions and ideas, and the interaction among them, probing the boundaries and nature of the complex relationships that shaped the actions and determined the route the Democrats followed on the political landscape."

Certainly in an area of study where our understanding is as primitive as is the case in the study of the Civil War Democracy, we need rough trailblazing. There is reason for a tentatively broad and comprehensive look. At times, however, Professor Silbey's statements become so blandly broad that they amount to little more than common sense reinforced by sociological jargon. He seems at times to say: the Democrats were a party and wanted to win a majority of votes but could not do so at the expense of taking over the platform of their more popular adversaries. Adding a few fancy names to an analysis of the election of 1864 does not necessarily help much either. "Position" and "valence" issues may have been the nub of the matter, but do those words change what we have thought for a long time? Though the Democrats were a loyal opposition, they went down to defeat in 1864 amidst unfair Republican charges that they were treasonous Copperheads. Does this statement of the conventional wisdom on the



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FIGURE 2. Manton Marble was the influential editor of the *New York World*, a Democratic newspaper generally aligned with the "Legitimist" wing of the party.

nature of the election say anything less than Silbey does?

Whether the broadly sweeping approach is the proper one seems to be a serious problem. Here is another example. Silbey sees as a milestone in party history Clement Vallandigham's "Address of Democratic Members of the House of Representatives of the United States, To the Democracy of the United States," published May 8, 1862. It "dramatically signalled the formal revival of partisanship by a major group of national Democratic leaders and intensified interest in building up the tactical plans necessary for party victory and the consequent preservation of cherished principles and values," says Silbey. This is his summary of the Address:

The bulk of the Address was an arraignment, first, of administration policies which were destroying the Union and, second, of the easy assumption that the Democratic party should be disbanded in order for the war to be carried on more effectively. Democrats recognized the need to support the government "in all constitutional necessity, and proper efforts to maintain its safety, integrity and constitutional authority." But that is not what was being asked of Democrats. They were being asked "to give up your principles, your policy, and your party, and to stand by the Administration in all its acts." This they could never do, particularly for the sake of the country. The Democratic party

is the only party capable of carrying on a war; it is the only party that has ever conducted a war to a successful issue, and the only party which has done it without abuse of power, without molestation to the rights of any class of citizens, and with due regard to economy . . . If success, then, in a military point of view be required, the Democratic party alone can command it.

Looked at from a closer perspective, the Address seems different. Vallandigham's capable biographer, Frank Klement, gives the Address rather a different interpretation, and Silbey certainly invites a comparison when he says in his footnote about the Address that Klement's book discussed the

Democratic meeting which produced the Address. This is Klement's summary of the meaning of the Address:

. . . he formed an ad hoc committee to prepare a statement of Democratic faith and tried to impose his antiwar views upon the other members. Some of the self-styled War Democrats, however, fully aware that Vallandigham's reputation as an antiwar man hurt rather than helped the party, used delaying tactics to nullify his leadership. Peeved and impenitent, Vallandigham then wrote a statement in collaboration with William A. Richardson of Illinois, tacked on the names of most Midwestern Democrats, and published it under the title "Address of the Democratic Members of the Congress to the Democracy of the United States." The document urged conciliation and compromises, recommended use of the ballot box to change the direction of events in the country, and asserted that states alone had the right to touch slavery . . . The . . . address emphasized the worthiness of states' rights doctrine, restating the views of Jefferson and Calhoun. It tied the Democratic party to the past, promising to reconstruct the Union upon prewar ideas and with prewar institutions. . . . The document tried to foist the slogan "The Constitution as it is, the Union as it was" upon the Democratic party.

Vallandigham's action helped to widen the schism already existing within the Democratic party. Some of those whose names had been attached to the address were incensed or embarrassed. "I think no document ought to have been sent out," wrote one who found his name listed as a sponsor, "which was not acceptable to the majority of our party." Astute Democrats like Manton Marble . . . recognized the weaknesses of the abortive document. It abounded with "uncandid aspersions" and failed to condemn the Southern rebels. Marble viewed the latter as inexcusable. He also recognized that the document was "a monstrous anachronism."

Instead of unity, Klement saw conflict within the party over Vallandigham's Address.

To look at still another source on the Address is to see that the conflict it aroused followed an interesting pattern. In the biography of Vallandigham written by his brother James, the production of the Address seems even more exciting. "He prepared an address which, after much delay and difficulty," James wrote, "was signed by twelve Democratic Representatives from the West (six of them from Ohio), and by two from Pennsylvania, and one from New Jersey; all the other Eastern members except one, and four of the Western, refusing peremptorily to sign it." Clearly, the party was split along sectional lines, and the Eastern wing wanted to have nothing to do with so extreme a spokesman as Vallandigham.

Silbey's approach is broad, too, in the sense that it does not focus on individual leaders but on the great mass of Democratic voters. One problem encountered as a result of this approach is symptomatic of a more general problem that plagues the study of political history in America today. Silbey constantly asserts — indeed, it is a major thesis of the book — that the party did not operate exclusively as a machine for vote-maximization. Rather, Purists always pulled the opportunists back to the bedrock of party beliefs. The Democrats, he says, agreed on a conservative ideology of "militant constitutionalism and a determination to remain in the organization of their fathers." Thus Silbey's Democrats were consistent in partisan impulse or habit and in belief.

From 1862 on, the Democratic leaders developed an extensive critique of the Republican administration. Their arguments grew out of an ideology rooted in their traditions and experiences and the perceptions developed in their past about the role and power of government, about the nature of

the Constitution, and about the direction of racial and social policy within the nation. Whatever new problems the war introduced into American life, the Democrats responded in their usual ways. There was, therefore, a timelessness, a static quality to their arguments. A new Republican outrage during the war provoked additional violent rhetoric but the overall structure of the Democratic argument remained basically the same from the first day to the last.

As Republican policies began to take on the aspect of a social revolution in Democratic eyes, "The Democrats believed they were in a battle between two cultures, two nations." In sum, "Democratic traditionalism in rhetoric and in belief was the most dominant aspect of their response to the war, the Lincoln administration, and their own minority status."

Although Silbey has read editorial opinion in selected newspapers and has studied party platforms, he does not really attempt the kind of study of party rhetoric which would confirm or deny his thesis for certain. In truth, it is not fashionable to make such studies. Silbey's approach, that of studying the party *en masse*, is all the rage and discourages more traditional party history. Yet, as is often the case, the conclusions of such studies *en masse* are about ideology and expressions of belief more than they are about measurable and quantifiable behavior.

In the final analysis, Professor Silbey has a strangely sentimental view of the nature of political parties. In his preface he tells us that vote-maximization was not the whole story of party history. "The party often needed more than victory: it also needed to retain its soul." That parties have souls would be news to many a quantifier of electoral behavior. Silbey may be right, but only studies of party rhetoric and of the principles and beliefs of party leaders will prove it.

One brief excursion into such study may serve to suggest caution in accepting the view that the Democrats were a consistent, ideologically conservative party of constitutional timidity. Looking at the nearest party ideology, that of Fort Wayne, I find less consistency and less legitimacy in the Democratic party. Amidst rumors that war had actually broken out in April of 1861, the Democratic newspaper seemingly blurted out its doubts: "what right have we to seek to force our southern brethren to remain in the Union when they are resolutely determined hereafter to govern themselves?" Only a standing army and military despotism would keep a reluctant South in the Union, and the Union might as well not exist, for it would have lost its essential identity as a free country. After Stephen Douglas gave some national guidance in another direction, and after some savvy second thoughts, the local party supported the war effort. In fact, it supported it so wholeheartedly that it came to endorse the arrest of the members of the Maryland legislature by Federal authorities who suspended their privilege of the use of the writ of *habeas corpus* in order to keep them from meeting to pass a secession ordinance. "While we entertain the strongest reverence for the writ of *habeas corpus*, and object to its being set aside for any ordinary grounds, we admit there are conditions when the safety of the country may require it," said the paper. It also admitted the necessity of censoring the war news in the press and urged the adoption of military conscription as the only way to equalize the burdens of the war (New England, it claimed, did not fill its quotas). Months later, complaints about the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*, censorship, illegal arrests, and soulless conscription would become the stock-in-trade of local Democratic ideology. It would require a considerable metaphysician to locate the soul in this party newspaper.

As broad as Silbey's conclusions may be, he still produces intelligible conclusions and, on the whole, delivers what he promises: an overall scheme of Democratic party history for the Civil War era. Dozens of scholars, graduate students, and

local historians will go to work now and perhaps find objections, nuances, and twists to the story of the party that Professor Silbey never expected. But without his model to begin with, they would all be lost on uncharted waters. To the first explorer goes the bulk of the glory of discovery.

One hates to end on a sour note, but book lovers everywhere should take alarm at this production. That a major publisher like W. W. Norton & Company could produce such an appallingly bad example of the bookman's art is a sad comment on the depths to which the publishing industry has fallen. The footnotes are at the bottom of the page, but, oh, what a price we pay for this one good point. The book is riddled with typographical errors. Here are a few: "They" for "The" (page xi), "principle" (page 11), "outbteak" for "outbreak" (page 45), "adolitionist" (page 83), "marital" for "martial" (page 87), and "opposd" (page 110). Nor did the publishers offer Professor Silbey much in the way of editorial assistance. On page 27, the editor allowed the author to use "if" for "whether" to introduce a noun clause. On page 28, the editor allowed the use of "destructionaries" as though it were a word. On page 29, the editor let "hopefully" mean "it was hoped" rather than what it really means, "in a hopeful state." Examples from those three consecutive pages indicate the quality of Norton's editorial standards, and this is not a matter of finicky taste. A good editor would not allow such unintelligible prose as this: "They verbalized their ideology in order to fight elections and personalized their argument to make it concrete to the individual elector" (page 79).



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FIGURE 3. Clement Vallandigham was the leader of the peace wing of the Democratic party. Nevertheless, at the Democratic convention which nominated McClellan for the Presidency, he moved that the nomination be made unanimous.

exception is the battle of Chancellorsville. There, just west of Fredericksburg, Va., Robert E. Lee achieved apotheosis as a general. Immeasurably assisted by Thomas J. (Stonewall) Jackson, Lee delivered an unparalleled performance of generalship to defeat the vastly superior forces of Union General Joseph (Fighting Joe) Hooker. Unhappily for the Confederacy, Jackson was mortally wounded by friendly fire after triumphing on May 2, the first full day of battle. But while Lee lost his best general, the South gained a myth in the martyrdom of Jackson, which only added to the legend of Chancellorsville. In "Chancellorsville 1863: The Souls of the Brave," his fine new study of the battle, Ernest Furgurson, a journalist and the author of biographies of

David C. Ward is a historian at the Smithsonian Institution.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS PHOTO CHANCELLORSVILLE 1863
Robert E. Lee arriving triumphantly in Chancellorsville, Va., in 1863.

Gen. William C. Westmoreland and Senator Jesse Helms, provides a close examination of the fighting. He also suggests the reasons Chancellorsville has had such talismanic importance for the South. Chancellorsville, not Gettysburg, Mr. Furgurson argues convincingly, was the true "high tide" of the Confederacy, both because it was a victory and because of the dramatic way Lee and Jackson won the battle.

As hostilities resumed after the winter of 1862-63, the Army of the Potomac, under Hooker, its latest commander, drove aggressively across the Rappahannock River, flanking Lee's base at Fredericksburg, Va.

He reveals his intentions in the way he opens his narrative. The first Union figure to appear in Chapter One is a balloonist in the Army intelligence service. The first Confederate is a private foraging supplies. The contrast is clear: the North with all the advantages of an advanced industrial society; the South, bereft of resources, dependent on the will of men fighting for a cause. Chancellorsville, then, was a victory for personal audacity, skill and courage in the face of the overwhelming material resources of the North. It was the last splendid victory of the cavalier over modernity.

A subversive final thought: Maybe Lee triumphed so magnificently only because of Hooker's failure. And maybe historians should stop burnishing legends, especially legends that caused this country such pain, both as they were forged in war and as part of the ideology of the South's "lost cause." □

McClellan at His Worst

TO THE GATES OF RICHMOND

The Peninsula Campaign.
By Stephen W. Sears.
Illustrated. 468 pp. New York:
Ticknor & Fields. \$24.95.

By Reid Mitchell

WHEN Bill Clinton accepted the Democratic nomination for President, he made a reference to Abraham Lincoln and George B. McClellan, confident that a sizable portion of his audience — including those who watched Ken Burns's Civil War documentary on public television — would recognize the anecdote. Thus McClellan, the Union general and unsuccessful Democratic nominee

for President in 1864, briefly re-entered American political discourse in 1992.

Stephen W. Sears has been disliking George B. McClellan through three long books (his two previous works on McClellan are "George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon" and "Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam"), and it is hard to see how he could dislike McClellan more. "To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign" is Mr. Sears's account of McClellan's most important campaign, in which he took a Union army up the Virginia Peninsula to within sight of Richmond — and then back down the peninsula, under his panicked orders. Citing the size of both the armies involved (forces from both sides totaled something close to 170,000 men), Mr. Sears calls the Peninsula campaign the largest single campaign of the Civil War. His book is the best study we have of it.

Among Civil War enthusiasts, individual campaigns and battles have their aficionados. One rarely, however, finds a buff for whom the Peninsula campaign is a special favorite. Part of its popularity problem is that the war's cast was still being shuffled; the actors

had yet to learn their parts. Stonewall Jackson, for example, was not yet "Lee's right arm," and in this campaign his generalship was at its weakest. Robert E. Lee himself took command only in the middle of the campaign, and for many Southerners anything before Lee is prologue. The very name "Peninsula campaign" sounds less like an engagement from the Civil War than a battle in the Napoleonic era.

Like several other Civil War generals, McClellan had Napoleon on the brain. The incongruity that informs Mr. Sears's portrait of Little Mac is between the general's self-image as the American Napoleon (dashing, masterful, beloved of his troops) and the reality of the whining, self-deluding blowhard. The spectacle that Mr. Sears carefully details is not really of Robert E. Lee defeating George B. McClellan; it is of McClellan defeating himself.

Lee, too, learned from Napoleon. Unlike McClellan, Lee fancied himself Napoleonic where it counted most: on the battlefield. Lee believed that in battle one army could still destroy another — an outdated belief, given the resilience of Civil War armies — and he was bitterly

Reid Mitchell is the author of "Civil War Soldiers" and of "The Vacant Chair," a forthcoming study of domesticity and the Union soldier.

disappointed when he failed to annihilate the Army of the Potomac. Lee's very willingness to fight insured victory over McClellan, a general too scared to risk combat. McClellan had hoped for a siege, culminating in inevitable victory. Instead, in hellish battles from June 25 to July 1, 1862, Lee presented him with a slugfest. A disheartened McClellan failed as a battlefield commander; indeed, he was not physically present at any of the fighting. At the same time, the Seven Days began Lee's emergence as the great Confederate hero.

Mr. Sears counts the cost of Lee's aggressiveness. During the Seven Days, 20,204 Confederates were killed, wounded or missing — 4,000 casualties more than the larger Union Army suffered. Yet Mr. Sears draws no conclusion from these statistics. Perhaps he thinks conclusions unnecessary. The new Civil War orthodoxy, which focuses less on operational brilliance and more on the systematic application of military resources and the changing nature of combat, has long disapproved of Lee's old-fashioned reliance on the offensive during what some view as the dawn of modern warfare.

Mr. Sears is arguably the pre-eminent living historian of the war's eastern theater. Like his earlier books on the Civil War, "To the Gates of Richmond" is thoroughly researched, well written

and shrewd in judgment. Bufts will have decided to buy it before they read this review.

What about other readers? Mr. Sears writes what might be called neo-traditional Civil War history; he re-examines generals and armies, battles and campaigns. He handles his material far more skillfully than McClellan handled his men. But "To the Gates of Richmond" does not tell the reader much about what underlay the war. The grand issues are absent in this account. There is little here of politics, of slavery and emancipation, of ultimate defeat and victory.

But the meaning of the Civil War is not found solely in its issues and their resolution. It is also embodied in human experiences. Mr. Sears succeeds in conveying something of the texture of the war as experienced by officers and soldiers in the two armies killing one another around Richmond in 1862. Part of the tragedy of the war — and therefore, part of the meaning — is that the deaths were not simply determined by the gods. They were products of individual decisions. At its best, military history can show us this. "To the Gates of Richmond" is military history at its best. If it attracts the audience it deserves, Presidential candidates can continue to cite the sorry example of George B. McClellan to make their points. □

Mad, Bad, Still Hard to Know

BYRON

By Sigrid Combuchen.
Translated by Joan Tate.
518 pp. North Pomfret, Vt.:
Heinemann/Trafalgar Square. \$24.95.

By Suzanne Berne



GEORGE GORDON, LORD BYRON, remains the most notorious of the Romantic

Accordingly, she has chosen to use Byron's poetic theories as her compass in tracing his life, particularly the theory behind his satiric masterpiece, "Don Juan." In that poem, Byron argues that to be portrayed realistically, life must be pictured as an unsystematic series of constantly shifting perspectives. "If a writer should be quite consistent," he asks, "How could he possibly show things existent?" From moment to moment the world is never the same, and neither are the people in it. As one character in this novel notes, "When you first get to know a person, and then get to know him ...

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The President had a long conference with McClellan, trying to pry out from him his real intentions. When did he intend to move? Did he mean to try to overtake Lee? The above picture shows the two seated in front of McClellan's tent at headquarters.

LINCOLN did not content himself with writing letters to McClellan. Twice during this distracting period he visited him. In May, he and Secretaries Stanton and Chase went down to Fortress Monroe, remaining there for five or six days, going over the field, visiting the forts, talking with McClellan, sizing up things. One dramatic incident to which this May party to the general was treated was the blowing up of the Merrimac by the Confederates, just before they started back to Washington. Again in July, after McClellan had gone into camp at Harrison's Landing on the James, he went to see him. How discouraged the Commander-in-chief must have been when he found that McClellan's mind at the time was chiefly occupied with an elaborate non-military plan for getting the nation out of its trouble, and that in this plan, which he had worked out at length and a copy of which he gave to Lincoln, he put more emphasis upon the President's policies and duties than he did upon his own! Another confirmation that this was not a fighting man. Moreover, it was not a man whose mind was occupying itself wholly with his own business.

Did he have an eye on politics—a future position? Perhaps even taking Mr. Lincoln's place? We know now that temptation was already coming McClellan's way—temptation to allow himself to be considered as the Democratic candidate

for the Presidency in 1864, in opposition to Lincoln. It was not the possible opponent that disturbed Lincoln, it was the divided mind of this man that this long document showed—so dangerous to the cause.

And yet he held on to his general! No one can go with him through these days and not feel something of the exasperation that most of his best friends and strongest supporters were feeling at this refusal to give up McClellan at this juncture; but when one asks oneself whom he could have put in his place, there is no satisfactory answer. He had no proved man at that moment. Men were still finding themselves, showing their mettle. If Lincoln had not

sensed at this moment that the most vital element in his problem was to find a man who could command with brains and fight with relentless energy, then he should be blamed. But he did sense this problem, and much of his time was given to studying every general on his long fighting line. Hardly a night now that he did not have before him a map of each man's activities, and as fast as a man developed to a point where he felt it safe to try him on larger things, he had begun to transplant him to those larger things. Thus in June, after Stonewall Jackson's raid on the Shenandoah valley, he called to Washington General John Pope, who had distinguished himself in the West, and put him at the head of a new army formed of all the Eastern forces outside of the army of the Potomac. And a little later he called General H. W. Halleck, who also had been giving good service in the West, to take the place of general-in-chief, from which four months before he had removed McClellan.

He was not too sure of Halleck, and Stanton did not like him; but he could try him out. At least he had been getting fighting out of the Western forces. And he called for more troops—300,000 volunteers. He had a task, we see, on his hands not unlike that which he had faced a year before, and a much more trying one.

The full meaning and horror of

war was now coming upon him. In the summer of the year before he had had some terrible experiences—the first battle of Bull Run, Ball's Bluff—but these had been like episodes in war. It was different now. War was becoming a settled condition. There was beginning to pass under his eyes now an exchange of dead and living, which was to be his sorrowful fate to watch continuously for nearly three years more. It was the wounded and dead pouring in from the South, passing on their way long lines of living from the North, coming to take their vacant places.



GENERAL GEORGE BRINTON
McCLELLAN



A Study in Personality by
WILLIAM STARR MYERS, Ph.D.
Professor of Politics, Princeton University

Illus., \$5.00

General George Brinton McCLELLAN

A Study in Personality by

WILLIAM STARR MYERS, PH.D.

This is an extraordinarily human biography of "Little Mac," perhaps the most controversial figure of the Civil War. Written from an absolutely unbiased viewpoint and with complete documentation throughout, it is the story of McClellan the man as distinguished from the military commander.

This special approach is entirely right, for in the great Union general's personality lies the key to his actions in the field. That he succeeded as a civil engineer in private life, that his judgment of Lincoln was that of an aristocrat, that his war maneuvers are approved by the leading military authorities of Europe, all of this is here subordinated to the engrossing study of those special qualities which made of McClellan one of the Civil War's most tragic failures. In short, the question which is raised by Professor Myers is why, with ability, experience, and real genius, was McClellan so thwarted in producing results. In this connection, the biographer shows that McClellan was by his very nature a poor subordinate, being noted for his stubbornness and pugnacity. Further, he had no conception of practical politics and this failure combined with his inborn traits to prejudice Secretary Stanton against him. Let it not be thought, however, that Professor Myers underestimates the stature of McClellan. Due attention is given to his military attainments—his activities in West Virginia, his work with the Army of the Potomac, his successful Antietam campaign, etc. Here, indeed, is a monumental historical work, invaluable to all students of American history and fascinating to the general reader.

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- I. ANCESTRY AND YOUTH; THE YEARS AT WEST POINT
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- IV. THE SUCCESSFUL BUSINESS MAN, 1857-1861
- V. MATTERS OF THE HEART
- VI. THE YOUNG NAPOLEON
- VII. DELAY, AND THE PERSONAL CONSEQUENCES
- VIII. "LITTLE MAC"
- IX. ANTIETAM, AND AFTER
- X. PERSONAL SHADOWS; STANTON, McCLELLAN, and LINCOLN
- XI. A DISASTROUS POLITICAL EXPERIMENT; PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN 1864
- XII. YEARS OF HAPPINESS; TRAVELS IN EUROPE, AND SUCCESS IN BUSINESS, 1865-1876
- XIII. GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY, 1878-1881
- XIV. THE CHRISTIAN GENTLEMAN

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His outrageous telegram to Stanton is quoted in full in Rothschild, LINCOLN MASTER OF MEN, p. 276, and the cutting of it by Military Supervisor of Telegrams, E.S. Sanford, when his attention was called to it by Major Thomas T. Eckert. This subject is further treated by Bates, D.H., LINCOLN IN THE TELEGRAPH OFFICE, p. 110.

AMERICAN STATESMEN

McClanahan
ARQUIN'S (Ryan)

Asynopsis, showing the order and content of the notes to be made for each biographical study.

- I. SOURCES. A. References to lists of sources.
 B. Detailed Lists of Sources
 1. LITERARY a. Primary
 b. Secondary
 c. Fiction
 2. OBJECTIVE. Places, Museums, Pictures, Monuments, statues, etc.
 3. MISCELLANEOUS. Sense Impressions, Music, Philology, Anthropology, etc.
- II. PORTRAIT AND OTHER PICTURES.
- III. MAPS. Fullpage outline maps. Residences and travels.
- IV. ANCESTRY including chart or "family tree".
- V. BIOGRAPHICAL CHART. All events to be entered on the page relative to their chronological position in the century.
- VI. STATISTICAL RECORDS of personal characteristics, etc.
- VII. OFFICIAL ASSOCIATES. (Cabinet officers, of presidents)
- VIII. STORY OF LIFE. A brief biography of salient facts.
- IX. RELIGION.
- X. SUMMARY.
 1. For what lasting achievements do we honor the subject of this study ?
 2. Why was he great ?
 3. What was the driving motive of life ,or- wherein lay the power of the personality studied ?
 4. What is the personal significance,- that is,- the value of the life of this person studied to your life ?
- XI. VERBATIM QUOTATIONS FROM WRITINGS OR SPEECHES.
- XII. MISCELLANEOUS NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINE ARTICLES. EULOGIES. POETRY.

(If you use color in any of your charts, for the sake of uniformity, please use green for periods of youth, red for maturity, and blue for last periods. Use, ofcourse, more colors if you desire, but follow this scheme so far as practical.)

SOURCES.

(General McClellan)

1. Bibliography of bibliography.

1. Encyclopedia Brittanica ---- Vol. 17 11th edition.
Vol. 14 14th edition.
- 2 Americana
- 3 History text books

2. Primary Sources

McClellands own story McClellands Mexican War diary
Life and Capaigns of Mc Clelland -- Hillard
Lincoln and Stanton---- Kelley

3. Secondary

Americana Vindication of a military career-- Campbell J.H.
Brittanica Little Mac and how he became a great general Addey W.
4. Fiction Great Commanders series-- Michie P.S.

Cease Firing Mary Johnson
Crisis Winston Churchill
Into Mexico with general Scott Edwin L Sabin
Westways--- S.W. Mitchell

4. Objective Sources.

Personal Memoirs
Standing tributes
Birthplace
tomb
Houses in which he lived
Civil War relics
Statues at Philadelphia and Washington
Pictures of the man himself.
West Point.

McClellan



GEORGE BRINTON MCCLELLAN

From a war-time photograph in the historical collection of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, Cadet Armory, Boston, Massachusetts

11111 1111

Places in the United States

Engineering in Wash
and Oregon Territories

Home in Chicago

Home in Cin

Born at Phil

Died at Maywood N,J

Work at Wash.

Campaigns against the south.

War with Mexico




TRIPS IN WORLD



To England - France, Italy, Spain -
India - Egypt, Arabia,

PENNSYLVANIA



NAME

Mc Clelland Born 1886 at Philadelphia Penn
Died 1885 at Mayfield Orange New Jersey

LINEAGE AND ANCESTERY

Son of George Mc Clelland and Elizabeth Brinton, a scotch Irish
His father was a doctor and mother a prominent person of the
district. Dad graduate of Yale and founder of Jefferson College

FATHER

MOTHER

BROTHERS

SISTERS

George McClelland Betty Brinton

~~one~~ THREE

one

PERSONAL APPEARANCE IN MATURE YEARS.

Height 5ft. 9 know nothing of weight, hair or th eyes.
General physique was ~~small~~ man with broad shoulders. ~~heavy~~ structure.
EARLY YOUTH.

Home training at Philadelphia

EDUCATION

Elementary
Private tutor

Secondary
Penn U. Academy

College and Univ.
West Point Military Acad.

Marriage

Date	Age	Name of Wife	Children	Living Decendents
May 1860	33	Ellen Marcey	one son who later become famous.	

HABITS

Alcohol	tobacco	Sports	Accomplishments
None	a little	Was a great horseman.	

RELIGION

Used his own religion Member of the ~~Methodist~~ ^{PRESBYTERIAN} Creed

LIFE SERVICE

Public Offices	Other Occupations	Authorship
Head of the army.	Head of Ill Central	Several books
Dem nominee for president, Vice. P. of Ohio -Miss.		Many magazine articles
Gov, Of New Jersey		His own defense of action
Head engineer of the New York docks		

Friends and Advisors

DEATH

DEATH	Date	cause	place	Burialplace	tomb
1885	at Mayfield	heart	Mayfield N.J.	Orange NJ	Phil

Notable monuments and Memorials

At Philadelphia and Washington (equestrian statues)

HISTORY OF LIFE

Autobiography

Biography

PICTURES

Portraits

Birthplace

Homes

Monuments

Degrees

Societies

Orders

Decorations

Many both U. S. And Europe

General George Brinton McClellan.

Was the son of George McClellan, M.D. and Elizabeth Brinton McClellan and was born in Philadelphia, Penn., Dec. 3 1826.

Was educated in Philadelphia., in 1841 and 1842 in the prep. school attached to the University of Pennsylvania. In 1842 he entered the military academy at West Point and graduated in 1846 when he was assigned to the Corps of Engineers as a second lieutenant. In September of the same year he went to Mexico where he received honors for serving with distinction in the war. He was made first lieutenant and later a captain at the war.

At the close of the war he commanded an engineer corp and brought it to West Point. Where he served with it acting also as assistant instructor of practical engineering until 1851. In that year he superintended the construction of fort Delaware . In 1852 he accompanied Captain R. B. Marcey on the Red River exploring expedition . In 1853 and 54 he was on duty in Washington territory and Oregon as an engineer officer, exploring a proposed route for the Pacific Railroad . In 1855 he was sent to Europe by the government in order to get information on military service in general and the practical changes then being made in military tactics.. It was on the whole the study of the art of war in Europe. They were actual observers of the actions taking place in the Crimean war. Jefferson Davis was the one to select him as the representative of U. S. because of his fitness. In January 1857 he resigned his commission as captain of the first cavalry and accepted a position, first as chief engineer and then as Vice president of the Ill. Central Railroad company.

He married Mary Ellen Marcy, daughter of General R.B Marcy and established his residence in Cincinnati Ohio, and became vice president

of the eastern division of the Ohio and Mississippi railroad company. Here he worked until his work commenced for him in the civil war.

He made great personal sacrifices to enter in the service of his country to enter the war as he was the recipient of a very large income and the prospects of his life were brilliant

From April 1861 he was made the major general of the volunteers of Ohio. On the 14 of May he was made the major general in the United States army and placed in the command of the department in Ohio. On the 26th of May he issued a proclamation to the Union men whom he had led in Virginia and saved that section of the state from the secessionists and from there went to Washington where he took command of the division on the Potomac. At this time the defeat of the Union at Bull Run put Washington in a perilous condition. McClellan saw the vast needs of the country with foresight and utter calmness. McClellan made sure of the safety of the Capitol. McClellan was the only person with the exception of Abe Lincoln that realized that the South would be something more than a pipe to conquer. The President confided in him and would have probably brought the war to a successful end at a much earlier date but Lincoln had two wars on his hands--- head of the Union and the political party and had to keep both intact.

The saving powers of McClellan were the salvation of the Union. After fortifying Washington, he directed his work towards the gathering of a great army

One characteristic he had which placed him at a

disadvantage in his relations at Washington was that he was very slow to suspect anybody.

As soon as McClellan arrived in Washington, Congress reemphasized his own sentiments by telling him that the war was not being held for oppression or subjugation but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and preserve the union.

In the period of the crisis McClelland was asked to run with the political machine of Chase because they realized his great strength in the party and among the people but he was not of that makeup and refused to do so saying . The politicians realized this and that something had to be done to get some of his popularity torn down, and above all he must not be allowed to get a decisive victory or he might end the war and it would go against the best party success. Thus the secretary of the treasury urged the removal of McClellan because he said that he was not loyal to his country.. Lincoln would not stand for the radical change so it became necessary for Mr Chase to induce Lincoln to put in Edward M Stanton to replace Mr. Cameron. McClellan had his plans for the attack of the war but he was not to be allowed to be successful so Stanton gave him other orders and put his army near disaster. This irked McClellan and he wrote the following note to the secretary that was not made public till years after the war--- "If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army.". His reply was to go with Mr. Chase to see the President to urge the Mr Lincoln to send General Pope to supersede General McClellan. 11.

But McClellan's mind was on his work and he forgot the work of the politicians. He had made Washington secure, he created the army of the Potomac, he gathered the vast material for war. Called to the chief command, he brought order out of the chaos in all the armies; he organized the first and only plan for war in all the country; he sent special expeditions with detailed orders, to North Carolina, New Orleans, in pursuance of his comprehensive scheme, in which concerted action every where was to be the direct relation to the chief act---the taking of Richmond. On this plan the war went on after his retirement. The politicians then removed him from the position that he held. No assistance was given either him or his army, the armies were being run by the politicians in Washington. Stanton and his associates tried to lay every blame and lie on the Little Napoleon. He had been the victim of political intrigues, baffled in every effort to serve his country, ordered against his better judgement and protest by his enemies. He was calm and cool in all actions -- never impulsive and rapid in action when the circumstance required. In 1864 the democratic party nominated him for the presidency and was defeated. In 65 he went to Europe with his family conscious of the animosity toward him by various leaders at the capitol but when he came home there was a massive demonstration in his honor. Over 100,000 met and greeted him.

In 1877 he was elected the governor of New Jersey on the Democratic ticket --- he refused another term but, and then again went abroad and visited Europe, Egypt and the Holy Land. He knew most the modern languages.

A heart attack suddenly seized him and after a few hours he quietly passed away at his home in Maywood New Jersey.

His funeral was one that he demanded that of a private citizen.

He was a member of the Presbyterian church.

Personal

PERSONAL TRAITS OF GENRAL MCCLELLAND

MCClelland was 5ft. 9 inches tall with a great breadth of shoulders. with solid muscle. He measured 48 inches around the chest. Often he would bend quarters over ~~an~~ with the force of his thumb and first finger. On a bet he once threw an officer that weighed over 250 pounds over his head to the ground.

He was very well cultured and well mannared at all times. He carried himself and his size very well. He wore a long heavy monstache with heavy eyebrows.

He never drank and smoked only at time . He was always doing something useful.

He gave up many chances to make a lot of money so that he could serve the government. He was only married two months when he rejoined the army when the civil war broke out. There is hardly a man in american History that held the affection of so many men that he came in contact with. He had virtue of manly silence, dignified self command of magnanimous fortitude,

MCCLELLANDS SON.

Goerge Jr. graduated from Princeton with high honors--- later associated with that great American institution Tammany Hall --- held many public offices and then became mayor of New York for three terms defeating Wm Randolph Hearst in 1905.

1789	Washington	90			
1797	Adams, J.				
1801	Jefferson	1800			
1809	Madison	10			
1817	Monroe	20			
1825	Adams, J. Q.				
1829	Jackson	30		16	Born, Dec 3, in Philadelphia, Penn. Educated in prepp school in Philadelphia.
1837	Van Buren	40			Entered West Point Military Academy.
1841	Harrison-Tyler				
1845	Polk			12	Graduated from West Point Served with honors in Mexican war--- made Captain. Commanded engineer corp. Instructor in engineering at West Point.
1849	Taylor-Fillmore	50			
1853	Pierce			3	Led Red River exploring expedition Explored and engineered in the Washington territory Sent to Europe by the govt. to study war methods Chief Engineer and vice President of Ill. Central RR Married Mary Marcey daughter of General Marcey. Vice President of Ohio, Miss. Railroad.
1857	Buchanan	60		8	Major General in 61 Dem. nominee for president against Lincoln.
1861	Lincoln				
1865	Johnson			5	Went to Europe and returned to New York Engineer of the New York Docks. (head Man)
1869	Grant	70			
1877	Hayes	80			Elected governor of New Jersey T
1881	Garfield-Arthur				Traveled abroad.
1885	Cleveland				Died of heart disease at Mayfield Orange, New Jersey

GENERAL GEORGE BRINTON MC CLELLAND,***

For what do we honor McClelland?

First of all he was such an honest unassuming man. He tried to do so much and yet he was limited to such a little in comparison to his great ability,. He was falsely accused and even his crushing victories were discredited by some lie. He saved the capitol and had crushing victories of South Mountain and Antietam. He planned the war , its battle all its movements while others took the honor and tried to crush the little Napoleon. But Mac raised no protest-- he did his duty and he was justified with himself and all those who worked with him.

WHY WAS MCCLELLAND GREAT.?

He was entirely unassuming--- he was loved by all his soldiers, never treated anyone cruelly, He was a truly educated man, knowing several languages and a student of all literatures and geographies of all countries. . His charity was abundant. He was a gentleman in every sense of the word, had rare power of conversation, always genial and his manner was always wholly unaffected. His happiness in life existed in what he could do for others without thinking of himself.

WHEREIN LAY THE POWER OF MACCLELLANDS LIFE?

McClellands power lay in his conscientiousness and his desire to do nothing but the right. His keen sense of moral right and love of all people . Probably these were in some sense a detriment for many took advantage of little Mac.--- he trusted every living soul.

General George B. ^{Brinton} McClellan
I

I B. of B.

1. Ency. Britannica -- Vol. 17 - 11th ed.
Vol. 14 - 14th ed.
2. Americana

II Primary

1. "Mexican War Diary"
2. "Life and Campaigns of Mc. --- Hillard
3. "McClellan's Own Story" N.Y., 1887

III Secondary

1. Great Commanders Series --- Michie, P. S.
2. Hillard, Life and Campaigns.

IV Fiction

1. ~~McC~~ Johnson, Mary --- "Cease Firing"
2. Churchill, W. --- "The Crisis"
3. Mitchell, S. W. --- "West ways"

VI.

STATISTICAL RECORDS FOR BIOGRAPHICAL STUDY

1. NAME Born 1826 (Dec. 3) at Philo Penn
 McClelland, Geo B Died 1885 at Mayfield, N.J.
2. LENGTH OF LIFE
3. FAMILY
 Father Dr. Geo Mc. Mother Elizabeth Brinton Brothers 3 Sisters 1
4. PHYSIOGNOMY IN MATURE YEARS
 Height 5' 9" Weight Hair Eyes General Physique Broad Shoulders Heavy
5. EARLY YOUTH Home training at Philo
6. EDUCATION
 Elementary Private Tutor Secondary Penno V Academy College and University West Point
7. MARRIAGE
 Date May, 1860 Age 33 Name of Wife Ellen Marcy Children One Son Descendants
8. HABITS
 Alcohol None Tobacco a little Sports Great horse man Accomplishments
9. LIFE SERVICE WITH DATES
 Public Offices Other Occupations
10. DEATH Date 1885 Cause heart disease Place Mayfield - Place of Burial Orange N.J. Tomb Phil.
11. NOTABLE MONUMENTS AND MEMORIALS
12. HISTORY OF LIFE. Best Biographies Authorship. Names of his books.
 130 Religion - Presbyterian

George B. McClellan

1800

1810

1820

1825

1830

Born, Dec. 3, in Philadelphia, Penn
Educated in Penn Prep School

1840

42

44

46

Entered West Point

graduated

Went to Mexico

1850

55

57

1860

61

Went to Europe to study War methods
Chief Eng. and Vice Pres. of Ill. Central R.R.
Married Mary Marcy (Daughter of Gen. Marcy)
Vice President of Ohio, Miss. R.R.
Maj. Gen.

64 - Demo nominee for Pres - Defeated

65 - Traveled in Europe

1870

77 elected Gov. of N.J. on Demo ticket

1880

1885

at Mapfield
Died of heart disease; buried at Orange N.J.

McClellan G.B.

NAME. McClellan, George Brinton. Dates. 1826-1885 Age at death 59

Famous as: General "Little Mac"

Born at: Philadelphia Date: Dec. 3, 1826

Died at Orange, N.J. Date: Oct. 29, 1885

Father: Mother:

Married (1)..... (2).....

Children Children
(Gen B. Mc. Mayor N.Y. 1903-1909)

U. S. Westpoint. Mex. War. Military Acad.

Events of life: Crimaeau War. Eng. & V.P. Ill. Cent.

Maj. Gen. Apr. '61. by Gov. Ohio.

May, '61. by Gen. Scott. (U.S.A.)

West Va. campaign, "first sharp, short wholly successful"

After Bull Run, July 21, '61 "Campaign of the war" (EB 17.201)

Commander of the Army of the Pot.

Nov. '61 Succeeded Gen. Scott as Com. in chief

Connection with Lincoln:

'61-'62 Pen. Camp. DISPLACED ("Change of Base")

Sept. 7 '62 Restored to Command. Antietam 16. 7 Sept '62

after 2. Bull Run

Nov. 7 '62 Displaced.

'64 Resigned
Candidate for Presidency

(Burnside)

Bayonet Exercise '52

Gov. N.J. '78-'81

Rep. on Pac. Railroad Survey '54

Jour. Europe

Author of:

Armies of Europe 1861

Magazine writer

Rep. on Org. of Armies of the Potomac '64

"His own Story." 1885

Works edited by:

Concise Biography

Biographies by: Michie: Gen. McC. (Great-Cov. Series)

Criticism of his writing on L.

Principal sources for facts of this page:

All above should be checked. EB & Emerson

